postgresql/src/backend/libpq
Tom Lane a59c79564b Allow root-owned SSL private keys in libpq, not only the backend.
This change makes libpq apply the same private-key-file ownership
and permissions checks that we have used in the backend since commit
9a83564c5.  Namely, that the private key can be owned by either the
current user or root (with different file permissions allowed in the
two cases).  This allows system-wide management of key files, which
is just as sensible on the client side as the server, particularly
when the client is itself some application daemon.

Sync the comments about this between libpq and the backend, too.

David Steele

Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/f4b7bc55-97ac-9e69-7398-335e212f7743@pgmasters.net
2022-02-28 14:12:52 -05:00
..
Makefile Refactor SASL code with a generic interface for its mechanisms 2021-07-07 10:55:15 +09:00
README.SSL Move EDH support to common files 2018-01-23 07:11:38 -05:00
auth-sasl.c Improve error handling of cryptohash computations 2022-01-11 09:55:16 +09:00
auth-scram.c Improve error handling of HMAC computations 2022-01-13 16:17:21 +09:00
auth.c Clean up messy API for src/port/thread.c. 2022-01-11 13:46:20 -05:00
be-fsstubs.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
be-gssapi-common.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
be-secure-common.c Allow root-owned SSL private keys in libpq, not only the backend. 2022-02-28 14:12:52 -05:00
be-secure-gssapi.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
be-secure-openssl.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
be-secure.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
crypt.c Improve error handling of cryptohash computations 2022-01-11 09:55:16 +09:00
hba.c Remove IS_AF_UNIX macro 2022-02-15 10:16:34 +01:00
ifaddr.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
pg_hba.conf.sample pg_hba.conf.sample: Reword connection type section 2021-04-29 07:00:20 +02:00
pg_ident.conf.sample Reformat the comments in pg_hba.conf and pg_ident.conf 2010-01-26 06:58:39 +00:00
pqcomm.c Remove IS_AF_UNIX macro 2022-02-15 10:16:34 +01:00
pqformat.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
pqmq.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
pqsignal.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00

README.SSL

src/backend/libpq/README.SSL

SSL
===

>From the servers perspective:


  Receives StartupPacket
           |
           |
 (Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) -----------  Normal startup
           |                  No
           |
           | Yes
           |
           |
 (Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
           |                       No        |
           |                                 |
           | Yes                         Normal startup
           |
           |
        Send 'S'
           |
           |
      Establish SSL
           |
           |
      Normal startup





>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):


      Connect
         |
         |
  Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
         |
         |
  Receive single char  ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
         |                                       |
         | '<else>'                              |
         |                                  Normal startup
         |
         |
   Is it 'E' for error  ------------------- Retry connection
         |                  Yes             without SSL
         | No
         |
   Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
         |                  Yes
         |
   Fail with unknown

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ephemeral DH
============

Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
server's private key.  Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).

N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.

Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
use DSA keys.  DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
are unacceptable.

The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
if there's a problem establishing an SSL session.  In this case you'll
need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).