postgresql

History

Peter Eisentraut ee3a1a5b63 Remove check for accept() argument types This check was used to accommodate a staggering variety in particular in the type of the third argument of accept(). This is no longer of concern on currently supported systems. We can just use socklen_t in the code and put in a simple check that substitutes int for socklen_t if it's missing, to cover the few stragglers. Reviewed-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/3538f4c4-1886-64f2-dcff-aaad8267fb82@enterprisedb.com		2021-11-09 15:35:26 +01:00
..
Makefile	Refactor SASL code with a generic interface for its mechanisms	2021-07-07 10:55:15 +09:00
README.SSL	Move EDH support to common files	2018-01-23 07:11:38 -05:00
auth-sasl.c	Fix incorrect format placeholders	2021-09-08 08:57:05 +02:00
auth-scram.c	Fix incorrect format placeholders	2021-09-08 08:57:05 +02:00
auth.c	Remove check for accept() argument types	2021-11-09 15:35:26 +01:00
be-fsstubs.c	Fix snapshot reference leak if lo_export fails.	2021-11-03 10:52:38 +02:00
be-gssapi-common.c	Don't assume GSSAPI result strings are null-terminated.	2021-06-23 14:01:32 -04:00
be-secure-common.c	Update copyright for 2021	2021-01-02 13:06:25 -05:00
be-secure-gssapi.c	Update copyright for 2021	2021-01-02 13:06:25 -05:00
be-secure-openssl.c	Second attempt to silence SSL compile failures on hamerkop.	2021-11-06 12:43:18 -04:00
be-secure.c	Allow matching the DN of a client certificate for authentication	2021-03-29 15:49:39 -04:00
crypt.c	Update copyright for 2021	2021-01-02 13:06:25 -05:00
hba.c	Fix RADIUS error reporting in hba file parsing	2021-05-31 18:43:48 +02:00
ifaddr.c	Update copyright for 2021	2021-01-02 13:06:25 -05:00
pg_hba.conf.sample	pg_hba.conf.sample: Reword connection type section	2021-04-29 07:00:20 +02:00
pg_ident.conf.sample	Reformat the comments in pg_hba.conf and pg_ident.conf	2010-01-26 06:58:39 +00:00
pqcomm.c	Remove check for accept() argument types	2021-11-09 15:35:26 +01:00
pqformat.c	Update copyright for 2021	2021-01-02 13:06:25 -05:00
pqmq.c	shm_mq: Update mq_bytes_written less often.	2021-10-14 16:13:36 -04:00
pqsignal.c	Use signalfd(2) for epoll latches.	2021-03-01 14:12:02 +13:00

README.SSL

src/backend/libpq/README.SSL

SSL
===

>From the servers perspective:


  Receives StartupPacket
           |
           |
 (Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) -----------  Normal startup
           |                  No
           |
           | Yes
           |
           |
 (Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
           |                       No        |
           |                                 |
           | Yes                         Normal startup
           |
           |
        Send 'S'
           |
           |
      Establish SSL
           |
           |
      Normal startup





>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):


      Connect
         |
         |
  Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
         |
         |
  Receive single char  ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
         |                                       |
         | '<else>'                              |
         |                                  Normal startup
         |
         |
   Is it 'E' for error  ------------------- Retry connection
         |                  Yes             without SSL
         | No
         |
   Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
         |                  Yes
         |
   Fail with unknown

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ephemeral DH
============

Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
server's private key.  Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).

N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.

Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
use DSA keys.  DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
are unacceptable.

The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
if there's a problem establishing an SSL session.  In this case you'll
need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).