mirror of
https://git.postgresql.org/git/postgresql.git
synced 2024-08-20 15:53:24 +02:00
The existing cryptohash facility was causing problems in some code paths
related to MD5 (frontend and backend) that relied on the fact that the
only type of error that could happen would be an OOM, as the MD5
implementation used in PostgreSQL ~13 (the in-core implementation is
used when compiling with or without OpenSSL in those older versions),
could fail only under this circumstance.
The new cryptohash facilities can fail for reasons other than OOMs, like
attempting MD5 when FIPS is enabled (upstream OpenSSL allows that up to
1.0.2, Fedora and Photon patch OpenSSL 1.1.1 to allow that), so this
would cause incorrect reports to show up.
This commit extends the cryptohash APIs so as callers of those routines
can fetch more context when an error happens, by using a new routine
called pg_cryptohash_error(). The error states are stored within each
implementation's internal context data, so as it is possible to extend
the logic depending on what's suited for an implementation. The default
implementation requires few error states, but OpenSSL could report
various issues depending on its internal state so more is needed in
cryptohash_openssl.c, and the code is shaped so as we are always able to
grab the necessary information.
The core code is changed to adapt to the new error routine, painting
more "const" across the call stack where the static errors are stored,
particularly in authentication code paths on variables that provide
log details. This way, any future changes would warn if attempting to
free these strings. The MD5 authentication code was also a bit blurry
about the handling of "logdetail" (LOG sent to the postmaster), so
improve the comments related that, while on it.
The origin of the problem is 87ae969
, that introduced the centralized
cryptohash facility. Extra changes are done for pgcrypto in v14 for the
non-OpenSSL code path to cope with the improvements done by this
commit.
Reported-by: Michael Mühlbeyer
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/89B7F072-5BBE-4C92-903E-D83E865D9367@trivadis.com
Backpatch-through: 14
162 lines
4.2 KiB
C
162 lines
4.2 KiB
C
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
*
|
|
* passwordcheck.c
|
|
*
|
|
*
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2009-2022, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
|
|
*
|
|
* Author: Laurenz Albe <laurenz.albe@wien.gv.at>
|
|
*
|
|
* IDENTIFICATION
|
|
* contrib/passwordcheck/passwordcheck.c
|
|
*
|
|
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
*/
|
|
#include "postgres.h"
|
|
|
|
#include <ctype.h>
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_CRACKLIB
|
|
#include <crack.h>
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#include "commands/user.h"
|
|
#include "fmgr.h"
|
|
#include "libpq/crypt.h"
|
|
|
|
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
|
|
|
|
/* Saved hook value in case of unload */
|
|
static check_password_hook_type prev_check_password_hook = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* passwords shorter than this will be rejected */
|
|
#define MIN_PWD_LENGTH 8
|
|
|
|
extern void _PG_init(void);
|
|
extern void _PG_fini(void);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* check_password
|
|
*
|
|
* performs checks on an encrypted or unencrypted password
|
|
* ereport's if not acceptable
|
|
*
|
|
* username: name of role being created or changed
|
|
* password: new password (possibly already encrypted)
|
|
* password_type: PASSWORD_TYPE_* code, to indicate if the password is
|
|
* in plaintext or encrypted form.
|
|
* validuntil_time: password expiration time, as a timestamptz Datum
|
|
* validuntil_null: true if password expiration time is NULL
|
|
*
|
|
* This sample implementation doesn't pay any attention to the password
|
|
* expiration time, but you might wish to insist that it be non-null and
|
|
* not too far in the future.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
check_password(const char *username,
|
|
const char *shadow_pass,
|
|
PasswordType password_type,
|
|
Datum validuntil_time,
|
|
bool validuntil_null)
|
|
{
|
|
if (prev_check_password_hook)
|
|
prev_check_password_hook(username, shadow_pass,
|
|
password_type, validuntil_time,
|
|
validuntil_null);
|
|
|
|
if (password_type != PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Unfortunately we cannot perform exhaustive checks on encrypted
|
|
* passwords - we are restricted to guessing. (Alternatively, we could
|
|
* insist on the password being presented non-encrypted, but that has
|
|
* its own security disadvantages.)
|
|
*
|
|
* We only check for username = password.
|
|
*/
|
|
const char *logdetail = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (plain_crypt_verify(username, shadow_pass, username, &logdetail) == STATUS_OK)
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
|
|
errmsg("password must not equal user name")));
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* For unencrypted passwords we can perform better checks
|
|
*/
|
|
const char *password = shadow_pass;
|
|
int pwdlen = strlen(password);
|
|
int i;
|
|
bool pwd_has_letter,
|
|
pwd_has_nonletter;
|
|
#ifdef USE_CRACKLIB
|
|
const char *reason;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* enforce minimum length */
|
|
if (pwdlen < MIN_PWD_LENGTH)
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
|
|
errmsg("password is too short")));
|
|
|
|
/* check if the password contains the username */
|
|
if (strstr(password, username))
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
|
|
errmsg("password must not contain user name")));
|
|
|
|
/* check if the password contains both letters and non-letters */
|
|
pwd_has_letter = false;
|
|
pwd_has_nonletter = false;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < pwdlen; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* isalpha() does not work for multibyte encodings but let's
|
|
* consider non-ASCII characters non-letters
|
|
*/
|
|
if (isalpha((unsigned char) password[i]))
|
|
pwd_has_letter = true;
|
|
else
|
|
pwd_has_nonletter = true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!pwd_has_letter || !pwd_has_nonletter)
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
|
|
errmsg("password must contain both letters and nonletters")));
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_CRACKLIB
|
|
/* call cracklib to check password */
|
|
if ((reason = FascistCheck(password, CRACKLIB_DICTPATH)))
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
|
|
errmsg("password is easily cracked"),
|
|
errdetail_log("cracklib diagnostic: %s", reason)));
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* all checks passed, password is ok */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Module initialization function
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
_PG_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
/* activate password checks when the module is loaded */
|
|
prev_check_password_hook = check_password_hook;
|
|
check_password_hook = check_password;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Module unload function
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
_PG_fini(void)
|
|
{
|
|
/* uninstall hook */
|
|
check_password_hook = prev_check_password_hook;
|
|
}
|