postgresql/src/backend/libpq
Michael Paquier e48b19c5db Generate new LOG for "trust" connections under log_connections
Adding an extra LOG for connections that have not set an authn ID, like
when the "trust" authentication method is used, is useful for audit
purposes.

A couple of TAP tests for SSL and authentication need to be tweaked to
adapt to this new LOG generated, as some scenarios expected no logs but
they now get a hit.

Reported-by: Shaun Thomas
Author: Jacob Champion
Reviewed-by: Robert Haas, Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAFdbL1N7-GF-ZXKaB3XuGA+CkSmnjFvqb8hgjMnDfd+uhL2u-A@mail.gmail.com
2023-08-26 20:11:19 +09:00
..
Makefile Refactor SASL code with a generic interface for its mechanisms 2021-07-07 10:55:15 +09:00
README.SSL Move EDH support to common files 2018-01-23 07:11:38 -05:00
auth-sasl.c Introduce macros for protocol characters. 2023-08-22 19:16:12 -07:00
auth-scram.c Remove support for OpenSSL 1.0.1 2023-07-03 13:20:27 +09:00
auth.c Generate new LOG for "trust" connections under log_connections 2023-08-26 20:11:19 +09:00
be-fsstubs.c New header varatt.h split off from postgres.h 2023-01-10 05:54:36 +01:00
be-gssapi-common.c De-Revert "Add support for Kerberos credential delegation" 2023-04-13 08:55:07 -04:00
be-secure-common.c Common function for percent placeholder replacement 2023-01-11 10:42:35 +01:00
be-secure-gssapi.c rename "gss_accept_deleg" to "gss_accept_delegation". 2023-05-20 21:32:54 -04:00
be-secure-openssl.c Revert "Add notBefore and notAfter to SSL cert info display" 2023-07-20 17:18:12 +02:00
be-secure.c Update copyright for 2023 2023-01-02 15:00:37 -05:00
crypt.c Update copyright for 2023 2023-01-02 15:00:37 -05:00
hba.c Eliminate fixed token-length limit in hba.c. 2023-07-27 11:56:35 -04:00
ifaddr.c Update copyright for 2023 2023-01-02 15:00:37 -05:00
meson.build Update copyright for 2023 2023-01-02 15:00:37 -05:00
pg_hba.conf.sample Add description for new patterns supported in HBA and ident sample files 2023-02-16 07:38:52 +09:00
pg_ident.conf.sample Add description for new patterns supported in HBA and ident sample files 2023-02-16 07:38:52 +09:00
pqcomm.c Use FD_CLOEXEC on ListenSockets 2023-08-24 17:03:05 +03:00
pqformat.c Change argument type of pq_sendbytes from char * to void * 2023-02-14 13:32:19 +01:00
pqmq.c struct PQcommMethods: use C99 designated initializers 2023-08-09 11:30:59 +02:00
pqsignal.c Use WaitEventSet API for postmaster's event loop. 2023-01-12 16:32:20 +13:00

README.SSL

src/backend/libpq/README.SSL

SSL
===

>From the servers perspective:


  Receives StartupPacket
           |
           |
 (Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) -----------  Normal startup
           |                  No
           |
           | Yes
           |
           |
 (Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
           |                       No        |
           |                                 |
           | Yes                         Normal startup
           |
           |
        Send 'S'
           |
           |
      Establish SSL
           |
           |
      Normal startup





>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):


      Connect
         |
         |
  Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
         |
         |
  Receive single char  ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
         |                                       |
         | '<else>'                              |
         |                                  Normal startup
         |
         |
   Is it 'E' for error  ------------------- Retry connection
         |                  Yes             without SSL
         | No
         |
   Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
         |                  Yes
         |
   Fail with unknown

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ephemeral DH
============

Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
server's private key.  Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).

N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.

Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
use DSA keys.  DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
are unacceptable.

The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
if there's a problem establishing an SSL session.  In this case you'll
need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).