postgresql/src/backend/libpq
Michael Paquier c3fb5809ea Replace loading of ldap_start_tls_sA() by direct function call
This change impacts the backend-side code in charge of starting a LDAP
TLS session.  It is a bit sad that it is not possible to unify the WIN32
and non-WIN32 code paths, but the different number of arguments for both
discard this possibility.

This is similar to 47bd0b3, where this replaces the last function
loading that seems worth it, any others being either environment or
version-dependent.

Reported-by: Thomas Munro
Reviewed-by: Thomas Munro
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yx0rxpNgDh8tN4XA@paquier.xyz
2022-09-12 09:07:10 +09:00
..
Makefile Refactor SASL code with a generic interface for its mechanisms 2021-07-07 10:55:15 +09:00
README.SSL Move EDH support to common files 2018-01-23 07:11:38 -05:00
auth-sasl.c Improve error handling of cryptohash computations 2022-01-11 09:55:16 +09:00
auth-scram.c Improve error handling of HMAC computations 2022-01-13 16:17:21 +09:00
auth.c Replace loading of ldap_start_tls_sA() by direct function call 2022-09-12 09:07:10 +09:00
be-fsstubs.c Prevent write operations on large objects in read-only transactions 2022-07-04 15:48:52 +09:00
be-gssapi-common.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
be-secure-common.c Remove misguided SSL key file ownership check in libpq. 2022-05-26 14:14:05 -04:00
be-secure-gssapi.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
be-secure-openssl.c Remove configure probe for netinet/tcp.h. 2022-08-18 16:31:11 +12:00
be-secure.c Remove configure probe for netinet/tcp.h. 2022-08-18 16:31:11 +12:00
crypt.c Improve error handling of cryptohash computations 2022-01-11 09:55:16 +09:00
hba.c Fix an assortment of improper usages of string functions 2022-09-06 13:19:44 +12:00
ifaddr.c Remove configure probe for sockaddr_in6 and require AF_INET6. 2022-08-26 10:18:30 +12:00
pg_hba.conf.sample pg_hba.conf.sample: Reword connection type section 2021-04-29 07:00:20 +02:00
pg_ident.conf.sample Reformat the comments in pg_hba.conf and pg_ident.conf 2010-01-26 06:58:39 +00:00
pqcomm.c Remove configure probe for sockaddr_in6 and require AF_INET6. 2022-08-26 10:18:30 +12:00
pqformat.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
pqmq.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
pqsignal.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00

README.SSL

src/backend/libpq/README.SSL

SSL
===

>From the servers perspective:


  Receives StartupPacket
           |
           |
 (Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) -----------  Normal startup
           |                  No
           |
           | Yes
           |
           |
 (Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
           |                       No        |
           |                                 |
           | Yes                         Normal startup
           |
           |
        Send 'S'
           |
           |
      Establish SSL
           |
           |
      Normal startup





>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):


      Connect
         |
         |
  Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
         |
         |
  Receive single char  ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
         |                                       |
         | '<else>'                              |
         |                                  Normal startup
         |
         |
   Is it 'E' for error  ------------------- Retry connection
         |                  Yes             without SSL
         | No
         |
   Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
         |                  Yes
         |
   Fail with unknown

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ephemeral DH
============

Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
server's private key.  Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).

N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.

Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
use DSA keys.  DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
are unacceptable.

The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
if there's a problem establishing an SSL session.  In this case you'll
need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).