postgresql/src/backend/libpq
Michael Paquier d46ad72f46 Create memory context for tokenization after opening top-level file in hba.c
The memory context was created before attempting to open the first HBA
or ident file, which would cause it to leak.  This had no consequences
for the system views for HBA and ident files, but this would cause
memory leaks in the postmaster on reload if the initial HBA and/or ident
files are missing, which is a valid behavior while the backend is
running.

Oversight in efc9816.

Author: Ted Yu
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CALte62xH6ivgiKKzPRJgfekPZC6FKLB3xbnf3=tZmc_gKj78dw@mail.gmail.com
2022-11-24 10:27:38 +09:00
..
Makefile Refactor SASL code with a generic interface for its mechanisms 2021-07-07 10:55:15 +09:00
README.SSL Move EDH support to common files 2018-01-23 07:11:38 -05:00
auth-sasl.c Improve error handling of cryptohash computations 2022-01-11 09:55:16 +09:00
auth-scram.c Improve error handling of HMAC computations 2022-01-13 16:17:21 +09:00
auth.c Refactor code handling the names of files loaded in hba.c 2022-10-26 11:42:13 +09:00
be-fsstubs.c Refactor ownercheck functions 2022-11-13 08:12:37 +01:00
be-gssapi-common.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
be-secure-common.c Remove misguided SSL key file ownership check in libpq. 2022-05-26 14:14:05 -04:00
be-secure-gssapi.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
be-secure-openssl.c Harmonize more parameter names in bulk. 2022-09-20 13:09:30 -07:00
be-secure.c Clean up some inconsistencies with GUC declarations 2022-10-31 12:44:48 +09:00
crypt.c Improve error handling of cryptohash computations 2022-01-11 09:55:16 +09:00
hba.c Create memory context for tokenization after opening top-level file in hba.c 2022-11-24 10:27:38 +09:00
ifaddr.c Remove configure probe for sockaddr_in6 and require AF_INET6. 2022-08-26 10:18:30 +12:00
meson.build meson: Add initial version of meson based build system 2022-09-21 22:37:17 -07:00
pg_hba.conf.sample pg_hba.conf.sample: Reword connection type section 2021-04-29 07:00:20 +02:00
pg_ident.conf.sample Reformat the comments in pg_hba.conf and pg_ident.conf 2010-01-26 06:58:39 +00:00
pqcomm.c Split up guc.c for better build speed and ease of maintenance. 2022-09-13 11:11:45 -04:00
pqformat.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
pqmq.c Update copyright for 2022 2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
pqsignal.c Provide sigaction() for Windows. 2022-11-09 13:06:31 +13:00

README.SSL

src/backend/libpq/README.SSL

SSL
===

>From the servers perspective:


  Receives StartupPacket
           |
           |
 (Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) -----------  Normal startup
           |                  No
           |
           | Yes
           |
           |
 (Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
           |                       No        |
           |                                 |
           | Yes                         Normal startup
           |
           |
        Send 'S'
           |
           |
      Establish SSL
           |
           |
      Normal startup





>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):


      Connect
         |
         |
  Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
         |
         |
  Receive single char  ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
         |                                       |
         | '<else>'                              |
         |                                  Normal startup
         |
         |
   Is it 'E' for error  ------------------- Retry connection
         |                  Yes             without SSL
         | No
         |
   Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
         |                  Yes
         |
   Fail with unknown

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ephemeral DH
============

Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
server's private key.  Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).

N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.

Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
use DSA keys.  DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
are unacceptable.

The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
if there's a problem establishing an SSL session.  In this case you'll
need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).