cfdf4dc4fc
Users of the WaitEventSet and WaitLatch() APIs can now choose between asking for WL_POSTMASTER_DEATH and then handling it explicitly, or asking for WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH to trigger immediate exit on postmaster death. This reduces code duplication, since almost all callers want the latter. Repair all code that was previously ignoring postmaster death completely, or requesting the event but ignoring it, or requesting the event but then doing an unconditional PostmasterIsAlive() call every time through its event loop (which is an expensive syscall on platforms for which we don't have USE_POSTMASTER_DEATH_SIGNAL support). Assert that callers of WaitLatchXXX() under the postmaster remember to ask for either WL_POSTMASTER_DEATH or WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH, to prevent future bugs. The only process that doesn't handle postmaster death is syslogger. It waits until all backends holding the write end of the syslog pipe (including the postmaster) have closed it by exiting, to be sure to capture any parting messages. By using the WaitEventSet API directly it avoids the new assertion, and as a by-product it may be slightly more efficient on platforms that have epoll(). Author: Thomas Munro Reviewed-by: Kyotaro Horiguchi, Heikki Linnakangas, Tom Lane Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAEepm%3D1TCviRykkUb69ppWLr_V697rzd1j3eZsRMmbXvETfqbQ%40mail.gmail.com, https://postgr.es/m/CAEepm=2LqHzizbe7muD7-2yHUbTOoF7Q+qkSD5Q41kuhttRTwA@mail.gmail.com |
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| Makefile | ||
| README.SSL | ||
| auth-scram.c | ||
| auth.c | ||
| be-fsstubs.c | ||
| be-secure-common.c | ||
| be-secure-openssl.c | ||
| be-secure.c | ||
| crypt.c | ||
| hba.c | ||
| ifaddr.c | ||
| pg_hba.conf.sample | ||
| pg_ident.conf.sample | ||
| pqcomm.c | ||
| pqformat.c | ||
| pqmq.c | ||
| pqsignal.c | ||
README.SSL
src/backend/libpq/README.SSL
SSL
===
>From the servers perspective:
Receives StartupPacket
|
|
(Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) ----------- Normal startup
| No
|
| Yes
|
|
(Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
| No |
| |
| Yes Normal startup
|
|
Send 'S'
|
|
Establish SSL
|
|
Normal startup
>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):
Connect
|
|
Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
|
|
Receive single char ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
| |
| '<else>' |
| Normal startup
|
|
Is it 'E' for error ------------------- Retry connection
| Yes without SSL
| No
|
Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
| Yes
|
Fail with unknown
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ephemeral DH
============
Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
server's private key. Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).
N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.
Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
use DSA keys. DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
are unacceptable.
The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
if there's a problem establishing an SSL session. In this case you'll
need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).