postgresql/contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c
Tom Lane e997758cb6 More pgcrypto fixes: avoid bogus alignment assumptions in sha2,
be more wary about having a value for BYTE_ORDER, clean up randomly-
chosen ways of including Postgres core headers.
Marko Kreen and Tom Lane
2005-07-11 15:07:59 +00:00

366 lines
7.9 KiB
C

/*
* fortuna.c
* Fortuna-like PRNG.
*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Marko Kreen
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $PostgreSQL: pgsql/contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c,v 1.2 2005/07/11 15:07:59 tgl Exp $
*/
#include "postgres.h"
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "rijndael.h"
#include "sha2.h"
#include "fortuna.h"
/*
* Why Fortuna-like: There does not seem to be any definitive reference
* on Fortuna in the net. Instead this implementation is based on
* following references:
*
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fortuna_(PRNG)
* - Wikipedia article
* http://jlcooke.ca/random/
* - Jean-Luc Cooke Fortuna-based /dev/random driver for Linux.
*/
/*
* There is some confusion about whether and how to carry forward
* the state of the pools. Seems like original Fortuna does not
* do it, resetting hash after each request. I guess expecting
* feeding to happen more often that requesting. This is absolutely
* unsuitable for pgcrypto, as nothing asynchronous happens here.
*
* J.L. Cooke fixed this by feeding previous hash to new re-initialized
* hash context.
*
* Fortuna predecessor Yarrow requires ability to query intermediate
* 'final result' from hash, without affecting it.
*
* This implementation uses the Yarrow method - asking intermediate
* results, but continuing with old state.
*/
/*
* Algorithm parameters
*/
/*
* How many pools.
*
* Original Fortuna uses 32 pools, that means 32'th pool is
* used not earlier than in 13th year. This is a waste in
* pgcrypto, as we have very low-frequancy seeding. Here
* is preferable to have all entropy usable in reasonable time.
*
* With 23 pools, 23th pool is used after 9 days which seems
* more sane.
*
* In our case the minimal cycle time would be bit longer
* than the system-randomness feeding frequency.
*/
#define NUM_POOLS 23
/* in microseconds */
#define RESEED_INTERVAL 100000 /* 0.1 sec */
/* for one big request, reseed after this many bytes */
#define RESEED_BYTES (1024*1024)
/*
* Algorithm constants
*/
/* max sources */
#define MAX_SOURCES 8
/* Both cipher key size and hash result size */
#define BLOCK 32
/* cipher block size */
#define CIPH_BLOCK 16
/* for internal wrappers */
#define MD_CTX SHA256_CTX
#define CIPH_CTX rijndael_ctx
struct fortuna_state {
uint8 counter[CIPH_BLOCK];
uint8 result[CIPH_BLOCK];
uint8 key[BLOCK];
MD_CTX pool[NUM_POOLS];
CIPH_CTX ciph;
unsigned source_pos[MAX_SOURCES];
unsigned reseed_count;
struct timeval last_reseed_time;
};
typedef struct fortuna_state FState;
/*
* Use our own wrappers here.
* - Need to get intermediate result from digest, without affecting it.
* - Need re-set key on a cipher context.
* - Algorithms are guaranteed to exist.
* - No memory allocations.
*/
static void ciph_init(CIPH_CTX *ctx, const uint8 *key, int klen)
{
rijndael_set_key(ctx, (const uint32 *)key, klen, 1);
}
static void ciph_encrypt(CIPH_CTX *ctx, const uint8 *in, uint8 *out)
{
rijndael_encrypt(ctx, (const uint32 *)in, (uint32 *)out);
}
static void md_init(MD_CTX *ctx)
{
SHA256_Init(ctx);
}
static void md_update(MD_CTX *ctx, const uint8 *data, int len)
{
SHA256_Update(ctx, data, len);
}
static void md_result(MD_CTX *ctx, uint8 *dst)
{
SHA256_CTX tmp;
memcpy(&tmp, ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
SHA256_Final(dst, &tmp);
memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
}
/*
* initialize state
*/
static void init_state(FState *st)
{
int i;
memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
for (i = 0; i < NUM_POOLS; i++)
md_init(&st->pool[i]);
}
/*
* Must not reseed more ofter than RESEED_PER_SEC
* times per second.
*/
static int too_often(FState *st)
{
int ok;
struct timeval tv;
struct timeval *last = &st->last_reseed_time;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
ok = 0;
if (tv.tv_sec != last->tv_sec)
ok = 1;
else if (tv.tv_usec - last->tv_usec >= RESEED_INTERVAL)
ok = 1;
memcpy(last, &tv, sizeof(tv));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof(tv));
return ok;
}
/*
* generate new key from all the pools
*/
static void reseed(FState *st)
{
unsigned k;
unsigned n;
MD_CTX key_md;
uint8 buf[BLOCK];
/* check frequency */
if (too_often(st))
return;
/*
* Both #0 and #1 reseed would use only pool 0.
* Just skip #0 then.
*/
n = ++st->reseed_count;
/*
* The goal: use k-th pool only 1/(2^k) of the time.
*/
md_init(&key_md);
for (k = 0; k < NUM_POOLS; k++) {
md_result(&st->pool[k], buf);
md_update(&key_md, buf, BLOCK);
if (n & 1 || !n)
break;
n >>= 1;
}
/* add old key into mix too */
md_update(&key_md, st->key, BLOCK);
/* now we have new key */
md_result(&key_md, st->key);
/* use new key */
ciph_init(&st->ciph, st->key, BLOCK);
memset(&key_md, 0, sizeof(key_md));
memset(buf, 0, BLOCK);
n = k = 0;
}
/*
* update pools
*/
static void add_entropy(FState *st, unsigned src_id, const uint8 *data, unsigned len)
{
unsigned pos;
uint8 hash[BLOCK];
MD_CTX md;
/* just in case there's a bug somewhere */
if (src_id >= MAX_SOURCES)
src_id = USER_ENTROPY;
/* hash given data */
md_init(&md);
md_update(&md, data, len);
md_result(&md, hash);
/* update pools round-robin manner */
pos = st->source_pos[src_id];
md_update( &st->pool[pos], hash, BLOCK);
if (++pos >= NUM_POOLS)
pos = 0;
st->source_pos[src_id] = pos;
memset(hash, 0, BLOCK);
memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
}
/*
* Endianess does not matter.
* It just needs to change without repeating.
*/
static void inc_counter(FState *st)
{
uint32 *val = (uint32*)st->counter;
if (++val[0])
return;
if (++val[1])
return;
if (++val[2])
return;
++val[3];
}
static void extract_data(FState *st, unsigned count, uint8 *dst)
{
unsigned n;
unsigned block_nr = 0;
/*
* Every request should be with different key,
* if possible.
*/
reseed(st);
/*
* If the reseed didn't happen, don't use the old data
* rather encrypt again.
*/
while (count > 0) {
/* must not give out too many bytes with one key */
if (block_nr > (RESEED_BYTES / CIPH_BLOCK))
{
reseed(st);
block_nr = 0;
}
/* produce bytes */
ciph_encrypt(&st->ciph, st->counter, st->result);
block_nr++;
/* prepare for next time */
inc_counter(st);
/* copy result */
if (count > CIPH_BLOCK)
n = CIPH_BLOCK;
else
n = count;
memcpy(dst, st->result, n);
dst += n;
count -= n;
}
}
/*
* public interface
*/
static FState main_state;
static int init_done = 0;
void fortuna_add_entropy(unsigned src_id, const uint8 *data, unsigned len)
{
if (!init_done)
{
init_state(&main_state);
init_done = 1;
}
if (!data || !len)
return;
add_entropy(&main_state, src_id, data, len);
}
void fortuna_get_bytes(unsigned len, uint8 *dst)
{
if (!init_done)
{
init_state(&main_state);
init_done = 1;
}
if (!dst || !len)
return;
extract_data(&main_state, len, dst);
}