1996-07-09 08:22:35 +02:00
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/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*
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* fe-auth.h
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1997-09-07 07:04:48 +02:00
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*
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* Definitions for network authentication routines
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1996-07-09 08:22:35 +02:00
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*
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2017-01-03 19:48:53 +01:00
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2017, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
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2000-01-26 06:58:53 +01:00
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
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1996-07-09 08:22:35 +02:00
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*
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2010-09-20 22:08:53 +02:00
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* src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.h
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1996-07-09 08:22:35 +02:00
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*
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*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*/
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#ifndef FE_AUTH_H
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1997-09-07 07:04:48 +02:00
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#define FE_AUTH_H
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1996-07-09 08:22:35 +02:00
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1998-01-26 02:42:53 +01:00
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#include "libpq-fe.h"
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1998-08-17 05:50:43 +02:00
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#include "libpq-int.h"
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1998-01-26 02:42:53 +01:00
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Support SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication (RFC 5802 and 7677).
This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the
GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL
authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL
messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage
messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows
adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall
protocol.
Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later.
The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet
implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with
non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep.
That will hopefully be added later.
Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification,
are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same
functionality, anyway.
If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing
an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from
a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is
created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these
motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user
exists, to unauthenticated users.
Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file.
Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different
stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev,
and many others.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi
2017-03-07 13:25:40 +01:00
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/* Prototypes for functions in fe-auth.c */
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2007-11-15 22:14:46 +01:00
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extern int pg_fe_sendauth(AuthRequest areq, PGconn *conn);
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Fix libpq's behavior when /etc/passwd isn't readable.
Some users run their applications in chroot environments that lack an
/etc/passwd file. This means that the current UID's user name and home
directory are not obtainable. libpq used to be all right with that,
so long as the database role name to use was specified explicitly.
But commit a4c8f14364c27508233f8a31ac4b10a4c90235a9 broke such cases by
causing any failure of pg_fe_getauthname() to be treated as a hard error.
In any case it did little to advance its nominal goal of causing errors
in pg_fe_getauthname() to be reported better. So revert that and instead
put some real error-reporting code in place. This requires changes to the
APIs of pg_fe_getauthname() and pqGetpwuid(), since the latter had
departed from the POSIX-specified API of getpwuid_r() in a way that made
it impossible to distinguish actual lookup errors from "no such user".
To allow such failures to be reported, while not failing if the caller
supplies a role name, add a second call of pg_fe_getauthname() in
connectOptions2(). This is a tad ugly, and could perhaps be avoided with
some refactoring of PQsetdbLogin(), but I'll leave that idea for later.
(Note that the complained-of misbehavior only occurs in PQsetdbLogin,
not when using the PQconnect functions, because in the latter we will
never bother to call pg_fe_getauthname() if the user gives a role name.)
In passing also clean up the Windows-side usage of GetUserName(): the
recommended buffer size is 257 bytes, the passed buffer length should
be the buffer size not buffer size less 1, and any error is reported
by GetLastError() not errno.
Per report from Christoph Berg. Back-patch to 9.4 where the chroot
failure case was introduced. The generally poor reporting of errors
here is of very long standing, of course, but given the lack of field
complaints about it we won't risk changing these APIs further back
(even though they're theoretically internal to libpq).
2015-01-11 18:35:44 +01:00
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extern char *pg_fe_getauthname(PQExpBuffer errorMessage);
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2001-10-28 07:26:15 +01:00
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Support SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication (RFC 5802 and 7677).
This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the
GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL
authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL
messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage
messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows
adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall
protocol.
Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later.
The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet
implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with
non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep.
That will hopefully be added later.
Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification,
are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same
functionality, anyway.
If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing
an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from
a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is
created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these
motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user
exists, to unauthenticated users.
Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file.
Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different
stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev,
and many others.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi
2017-03-07 13:25:40 +01:00
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/* Prototypes for functions in fe-auth-scram.c */
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extern void *pg_fe_scram_init(const char *username, const char *password);
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extern void pg_fe_scram_free(void *opaq);
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extern void pg_fe_scram_exchange(void *opaq, char *input, int inputlen,
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char **output, int *outputlen,
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bool *done, bool *success, PQExpBuffer errorMessage);
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2001-11-05 18:46:40 +01:00
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#endif /* FE_AUTH_H */
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