1997-12-04 01:34:01 +01:00
|
|
|
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
*
|
1999-02-14 00:22:53 +01:00
|
|
|
* user.c
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* Commands for manipulating roles (formerly called users).
|
1997-12-04 01:34:01 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
2016-01-02 19:33:40 +01:00
|
|
|
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2016, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
|
2000-01-26 06:58:53 +01:00
|
|
|
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
|
1997-12-04 01:34:01 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
2010-09-20 22:08:53 +02:00
|
|
|
* src/backend/commands/user.c
|
1997-12-04 01:34:01 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2001-06-12 07:55:50 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "postgres.h"
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "access/genam.h"
|
1999-07-16 07:00:38 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "access/heapam.h"
|
2012-08-30 22:15:44 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "access/htup_details.h"
|
2006-07-13 18:49:20 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "access/xact.h"
|
2013-12-19 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "catalog/binary_upgrade.h"
|
2016-04-08 22:56:27 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "catalog/catalog.h"
|
2005-07-07 22:40:02 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "catalog/dependency.h"
|
2002-08-30 03:01:02 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "catalog/indexing.h"
|
2010-11-25 17:48:49 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "catalog/objectaccess.h"
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "catalog/pg_auth_members.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "catalog/pg_authid.h"
|
2009-10-08 00:14:26 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "catalog/pg_database.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "catalog/pg_db_role_setting.h"
|
2006-02-12 04:22:21 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "commands/comment.h"
|
2009-10-08 00:14:26 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "commands/dbcommands.h"
|
2011-07-20 19:18:24 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "commands/seclabel.h"
|
1999-07-16 07:00:38 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "commands/user.h"
|
2006-06-20 21:56:52 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "libpq/md5.h"
|
1999-07-16 07:00:38 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "miscadmin.h"
|
2008-05-12 02:00:54 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "storage/lmgr.h"
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "utils/acl.h"
|
2000-01-14 23:11:38 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "utils/builtins.h"
|
2000-05-28 19:56:29 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "utils/fmgroids.h"
|
1999-07-16 01:04:24 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "utils/syscache.h"
|
2011-09-09 19:23:41 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "utils/timestamp.h"
|
2008-03-26 22:10:39 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "utils/tqual.h"
|
1997-12-04 01:34:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-11 03:33:25 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Potentially set by pg_upgrade_support functions */
|
2011-01-08 03:59:29 +01:00
|
|
|
Oid binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid = InvalidOid;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-06-12 07:55:50 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-11-18 22:57:56 +01:00
|
|
|
/* GUC parameter */
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
extern bool Password_encryption;
|
1998-12-14 07:50:32 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2009-11-18 22:57:56 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Hook to check passwords in CreateRole() and AlterRole() */
|
|
|
|
check_password_hook_type check_password_hook = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
static void AddRoleMems(const char *rolename, Oid roleid,
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds,
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
Oid grantorId, bool admin_opt);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
static void DelRoleMems(const char *rolename, Oid roleid,
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds,
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
bool admin_opt);
|
2002-04-04 06:25:54 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Check if current user has createrole privileges */
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
|
|
have_createrole_privilege(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return has_createrole_privilege(GetUserId());
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-14 23:11:38 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* CREATE ROLE
|
1997-12-04 01:34:01 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-12-29 13:55:37 +01:00
|
|
|
Oid
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
CreateRole(CreateRoleStmt *stmt)
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
Relation pg_authid_rel;
|
|
|
|
TupleDesc pg_authid_dsc;
|
1999-05-25 18:15:34 +02:00
|
|
|
HeapTuple tuple;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
Datum new_record[Natts_pg_authid];
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
bool new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_authid];
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
Oid roleid;
|
2004-05-26 06:41:50 +02:00
|
|
|
ListCell *item;
|
|
|
|
ListCell *option;
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
char *password = NULL; /* user password */
|
2001-10-25 07:50:21 +02:00
|
|
|
bool encrypt_password = Password_encryption; /* encrypt password? */
|
|
|
|
char encrypted_password[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
bool issuper = false; /* Make the user a superuser? */
|
|
|
|
bool inherit = true; /* Auto inherit privileges? */
|
|
|
|
bool createrole = false; /* Can this user create roles? */
|
|
|
|
bool createdb = false; /* Can the user create databases? */
|
|
|
|
bool canlogin = false; /* Can this user login? */
|
|
|
|
bool isreplication = false; /* Is this a replication role? */
|
2015-05-24 03:35:49 +02:00
|
|
|
bool bypassrls = false; /* Is this a row security enabled
|
|
|
|
* role? */
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
int connlimit = -1; /* maximum connections allowed */
|
|
|
|
List *addroleto = NIL; /* roles to make this a member of */
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
List *rolemembers = NIL; /* roles to be members of this role */
|
|
|
|
List *adminmembers = NIL; /* roles to be admins of this role */
|
|
|
|
char *validUntil = NULL; /* time the login is valid until */
|
2009-11-18 22:57:56 +01:00
|
|
|
Datum validUntil_datum; /* same, as timestamptz Datum */
|
|
|
|
bool validUntil_null;
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dpassword = NULL;
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dissuper = NULL;
|
2005-07-26 18:38:29 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dinherit = NULL;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dcreaterole = NULL;
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dcreatedb = NULL;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dcanlogin = NULL;
|
2011-04-10 17:42:00 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *disreplication = NULL;
|
2005-07-31 19:19:22 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dconnlimit = NULL;
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *daddroleto = NULL;
|
|
|
|
DefElem *drolemembers = NULL;
|
|
|
|
DefElem *dadminmembers = NULL;
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dvalidUntil = NULL;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
2014-09-19 17:18:35 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dbypassRLS = NULL;
|
2001-07-11 00:09:29 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
/* The defaults can vary depending on the original statement type */
|
2005-07-26 18:38:29 +02:00
|
|
|
switch (stmt->stmt_type)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
case ROLESTMT_ROLE:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ROLESTMT_USER:
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
canlogin = true;
|
2005-07-26 18:38:29 +02:00
|
|
|
/* may eventually want inherit to default to false here */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ROLESTMT_GROUP:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 00:09:29 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Extract options from the statement node tree */
|
|
|
|
foreach(option, stmt->options)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-10-25 07:50:21 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *defel = (DefElem *) lfirst(option);
|
2001-07-11 00:09:29 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-19 11:48:42 +02:00
|
|
|
if (strcmp(defel->defname, "password") == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
strcmp(defel->defname, "encryptedPassword") == 0 ||
|
2001-10-25 07:50:21 +02:00
|
|
|
strcmp(defel->defname, "unencryptedPassword") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dpassword)
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
dpassword = defel;
|
2001-09-19 11:48:42 +02:00
|
|
|
if (strcmp(defel->defname, "encryptedPassword") == 0)
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
encrypt_password = true;
|
2001-09-19 11:48:42 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "unencryptedPassword") == 0)
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
encrypt_password = false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-10-25 07:50:21 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "sysid") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2005-07-26 18:38:29 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(NOTICE,
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
(errmsg("SYSID can no longer be specified")));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "superuser") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (dissuper)
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
|
|
|
dissuper = defel;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-07-26 18:38:29 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "inherit") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (dinherit)
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
|
|
|
dinherit = defel;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createrole") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (dcreaterole)
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
dcreaterole = defel;
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-10-25 07:50:21 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createdb") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dcreatedb)
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
dcreatedb = defel;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "canlogin") == 0)
|
2001-10-25 07:50:21 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dcanlogin)
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
dcanlogin = defel;
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-12-29 11:05:03 +01:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "isreplication") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (disreplication)
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
|
|
|
disreplication = defel;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-07-31 19:19:22 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "connectionlimit") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (dconnlimit)
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
|
|
|
dconnlimit = defel;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "addroleto") == 0)
|
2001-10-25 07:50:21 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
if (daddroleto)
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
daddroleto = defel;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "rolemembers") == 0)
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
if (drolemembers)
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
drolemembers = defel;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "adminmembers") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (dadminmembers)
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
|
|
|
dadminmembers = defel;
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-10-25 07:50:21 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "validUntil") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dvalidUntil)
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
dvalidUntil = defel;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
2014-09-19 17:18:35 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "bypassrls") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (dbypassRLS)
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
|
|
|
dbypassRLS = defel;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
else
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
elog(ERROR, "option \"%s\" not recognized",
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
defel->defname);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-12-23 17:46:39 +01:00
|
|
|
if (dpassword && dpassword->arg)
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
password = strVal(dpassword->arg);
|
|
|
|
if (dissuper)
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
issuper = intVal(dissuper->arg) != 0;
|
2005-07-26 18:38:29 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dinherit)
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
inherit = intVal(dinherit->arg) != 0;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dcreaterole)
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
createrole = intVal(dcreaterole->arg) != 0;
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dcreatedb)
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
createdb = intVal(dcreatedb->arg) != 0;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dcanlogin)
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
canlogin = intVal(dcanlogin->arg) != 0;
|
2010-12-29 11:05:03 +01:00
|
|
|
if (disreplication)
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
isreplication = intVal(disreplication->arg) != 0;
|
2005-07-31 19:19:22 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dconnlimit)
|
2009-01-30 18:24:47 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-07-31 19:19:22 +02:00
|
|
|
connlimit = intVal(dconnlimit->arg);
|
2009-01-30 18:24:47 +01:00
|
|
|
if (connlimit < -1)
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("invalid connection limit: %d", connlimit)));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
if (daddroleto)
|
|
|
|
addroleto = (List *) daddroleto->arg;
|
|
|
|
if (drolemembers)
|
|
|
|
rolemembers = (List *) drolemembers->arg;
|
|
|
|
if (dadminmembers)
|
|
|
|
adminmembers = (List *) dadminmembers->arg;
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dvalidUntil)
|
|
|
|
validUntil = strVal(dvalidUntil->arg);
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (dbypassRLS)
|
|
|
|
bypassrls = intVal(dbypassRLS->arg) != 0;
|
1999-04-02 08:16:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Check some permissions first */
|
|
|
|
if (issuper)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!superuser())
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("must be superuser to create superusers")));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (isreplication)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!superuser())
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("must be superuser to create replication users")));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (bypassrls)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!superuser())
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
2015-07-07 04:16:53 +02:00
|
|
|
errmsg("must be superuser to change bypassrls attribute")));
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!have_createrole_privilege())
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("permission denied to create role")));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-01-14 23:11:38 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-04-08 22:56:27 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check that the user is not trying to create a role in the reserved
|
|
|
|
* "pg_" namespace.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (IsReservedName(stmt->role))
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_RESERVED_NAME),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("role name \"%s\" is reserved",
|
|
|
|
stmt->role),
|
|
|
|
errdetail("Role names starting with \"pg_\" are reserved.")));
|
|
|
|
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Check the pg_authid relation to be certain the role doesn't already
|
2006-05-04 18:07:29 +02:00
|
|
|
* exist.
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-05-04 18:07:29 +02:00
|
|
|
pg_authid_rel = heap_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
pg_authid_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authid_rel);
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2010-08-05 16:45:09 +02:00
|
|
|
if (OidIsValid(get_role_oid(stmt->role, true)))
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_OBJECT),
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
errmsg("role \"%s\" already exists",
|
|
|
|
stmt->role)));
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2009-11-18 22:57:56 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Convert validuntil to internal form */
|
|
|
|
if (validUntil)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
validUntil_datum = DirectFunctionCall3(timestamptz_in,
|
|
|
|
CStringGetDatum(validUntil),
|
|
|
|
ObjectIdGetDatum(InvalidOid),
|
|
|
|
Int32GetDatum(-1));
|
|
|
|
validUntil_null = false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
validUntil_datum = (Datum) 0;
|
|
|
|
validUntil_null = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Call the password checking hook if there is one defined
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (check_password_hook && password)
|
|
|
|
(*check_password_hook) (stmt->role,
|
|
|
|
password,
|
2010-02-26 03:01:40 +01:00
|
|
|
isMD5(password) ? PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5 : PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT,
|
2009-11-18 22:57:56 +01:00
|
|
|
validUntil_datum,
|
|
|
|
validUntil_null);
|
|
|
|
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Build a tuple to insert
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
MemSet(new_record, 0, sizeof(new_record));
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
MemSet(new_record_nulls, false, sizeof(new_record_nulls));
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] =
|
|
|
|
DirectFunctionCall1(namein, CStringGetDatum(stmt->role));
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolsuper - 1] = BoolGetDatum(issuper);
|
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolinherit - 1] = BoolGetDatum(inherit);
|
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreaterole - 1] = BoolGetDatum(createrole);
|
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreatedb - 1] = BoolGetDatum(createdb);
|
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcanlogin - 1] = BoolGetDatum(canlogin);
|
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolreplication - 1] = BoolGetDatum(isreplication);
|
2005-07-31 19:19:22 +02:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolconnlimit - 1] = Int32GetDatum(connlimit);
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 00:09:29 +02:00
|
|
|
if (password)
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!encrypt_password || isMD5(password))
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] =
|
2008-03-25 23:42:46 +01:00
|
|
|
CStringGetTextDatum(password);
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
2005-10-17 18:24:20 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(password, stmt->role, strlen(stmt->role),
|
|
|
|
encrypted_password))
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
elog(ERROR, "password encryption failed");
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] =
|
2008-03-25 23:42:46 +01:00
|
|
|
CStringGetTextDatum(encrypted_password);
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
else
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-11-18 22:57:56 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_datum;
|
|
|
|
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_null;
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolbypassrls - 1] = BoolGetDatum(bypassrls);
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
tuple = heap_form_tuple(pg_authid_dsc, new_record, new_record_nulls);
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2011-01-08 03:59:29 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2011-04-10 17:42:00 +02:00
|
|
|
* pg_largeobject_metadata contains pg_authid.oid's, so we use the
|
2014-08-26 04:19:05 +02:00
|
|
|
* binary-upgrade override.
|
2011-01-08 03:59:29 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-08-26 04:19:05 +02:00
|
|
|
if (IsBinaryUpgrade)
|
2011-01-08 03:59:29 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-08-26 04:19:05 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!OidIsValid(binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid))
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("pg_authid OID value not set when in binary upgrade mode")));
|
|
|
|
|
2011-01-08 03:59:29 +01:00
|
|
|
HeapTupleSetOid(tuple, binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid);
|
|
|
|
binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid = InvalidOid;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* Insert new record in the pg_authid table
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
roleid = simple_heap_insert(pg_authid_rel, tuple);
|
|
|
|
CatalogUpdateIndexes(pg_authid_rel, tuple);
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Advance command counter so we can see new record; else tests in
|
|
|
|
* AddRoleMems may fail.
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (addroleto || adminmembers || rolemembers)
|
|
|
|
CommandCounterIncrement();
|
|
|
|
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* Add the new role to the specified existing roles.
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
foreach(item, addroleto)
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-09 21:00:43 +01:00
|
|
|
RoleSpec *oldrole = lfirst(item);
|
|
|
|
HeapTuple oldroletup = get_rolespec_tuple((Node *) oldrole);
|
|
|
|
Oid oldroleid = HeapTupleGetOid(oldroletup);
|
|
|
|
char *oldrolename = NameStr(((Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(oldroletup))->rolname);
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
AddRoleMems(oldrolename, oldroleid,
|
|
|
|
list_make1(makeString(stmt->role)),
|
|
|
|
list_make1_oid(roleid),
|
|
|
|
GetUserId(), false);
|
2015-03-09 21:00:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ReleaseSysCache(oldroletup);
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Add the specified members to this new role. adminmembers get the admin
|
|
|
|
* option, rolemembers don't.
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
AddRoleMems(stmt->role, roleid,
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
adminmembers, roleSpecsToIds(adminmembers),
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
GetUserId(), true);
|
|
|
|
AddRoleMems(stmt->role, roleid,
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
rolemembers, roleSpecsToIds(rolemembers),
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
GetUserId(), false);
|
|
|
|
|
2010-11-25 17:48:49 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Post creation hook for new role */
|
2013-03-07 02:52:06 +01:00
|
|
|
InvokeObjectPostCreateHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0);
|
2010-11-25 17:48:49 +01:00
|
|
|
|
1999-09-18 21:08:25 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-09-01 04:54:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit.
|
1999-09-18 21:08:25 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
heap_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock);
|
2012-12-29 13:55:37 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return roleid;
|
1997-12-04 01:34:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-14 23:11:38 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* ALTER ROLE
|
2005-07-27 00:37:50 +02:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note: the rolemembers option accepted here is intended to support the
|
|
|
|
* backwards-compatible ALTER GROUP syntax. Although it will work to say
|
|
|
|
* "ALTER ROLE role ROLE rolenames", we don't document it.
|
2000-01-14 23:11:38 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-12-29 13:55:37 +01:00
|
|
|
Oid
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
AlterRole(AlterRoleStmt *stmt)
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
Datum new_record[Natts_pg_authid];
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
bool new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_authid];
|
|
|
|
bool new_record_repl[Natts_pg_authid];
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
Relation pg_authid_rel;
|
|
|
|
TupleDesc pg_authid_dsc;
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
HeapTuple tuple,
|
|
|
|
new_tuple;
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
Form_pg_authid authform;
|
2004-05-26 06:41:50 +02:00
|
|
|
ListCell *option;
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
char *rolename = NULL;
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
char *password = NULL; /* user password */
|
2001-10-25 07:50:21 +02:00
|
|
|
bool encrypt_password = Password_encryption; /* encrypt password? */
|
|
|
|
char encrypted_password[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
int issuper = -1; /* Make the user a superuser? */
|
|
|
|
int inherit = -1; /* Auto inherit privileges? */
|
|
|
|
int createrole = -1; /* Can this user create roles? */
|
|
|
|
int createdb = -1; /* Can the user create databases? */
|
|
|
|
int canlogin = -1; /* Can this user login? */
|
2011-04-10 17:42:00 +02:00
|
|
|
int isreplication = -1; /* Is this a replication role? */
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
int connlimit = -1; /* maximum connections allowed */
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
List *rolemembers = NIL; /* roles to be added/removed */
|
|
|
|
char *validUntil = NULL; /* time the login is valid until */
|
2009-11-18 22:57:56 +01:00
|
|
|
Datum validUntil_datum; /* same, as timestamptz Datum */
|
|
|
|
bool validUntil_null;
|
2015-08-21 14:22:22 +02:00
|
|
|
int bypassrls = -1;
|
2001-07-11 00:09:29 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dpassword = NULL;
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dissuper = NULL;
|
2005-07-26 18:38:29 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dinherit = NULL;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dcreaterole = NULL;
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dcreatedb = NULL;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dcanlogin = NULL;
|
2011-04-10 17:42:00 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *disreplication = NULL;
|
2005-07-31 19:19:22 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dconnlimit = NULL;
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *drolemembers = NULL;
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dvalidUntil = NULL;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
2014-09-19 17:18:35 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *dbypassRLS = NULL;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
Oid roleid;
|
2001-07-11 00:09:29 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-04-08 22:56:27 +02:00
|
|
|
check_rolespec_name(stmt->role,
|
|
|
|
"Cannot alter reserved roles.");
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 00:09:29 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Extract options from the statement node tree */
|
2001-10-25 07:50:21 +02:00
|
|
|
foreach(option, stmt->options)
|
2001-07-11 00:09:29 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-10-25 07:50:21 +02:00
|
|
|
DefElem *defel = (DefElem *) lfirst(option);
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-19 11:48:42 +02:00
|
|
|
if (strcmp(defel->defname, "password") == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
strcmp(defel->defname, "encryptedPassword") == 0 ||
|
2001-10-25 07:50:21 +02:00
|
|
|
strcmp(defel->defname, "unencryptedPassword") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-07-11 00:09:29 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dpassword)
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
2001-07-11 00:09:29 +02:00
|
|
|
dpassword = defel;
|
2001-09-19 11:48:42 +02:00
|
|
|
if (strcmp(defel->defname, "encryptedPassword") == 0)
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
encrypt_password = true;
|
2001-09-19 11:48:42 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "unencryptedPassword") == 0)
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
encrypt_password = false;
|
2001-07-11 00:09:29 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "superuser") == 0)
|
2001-10-25 07:50:21 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dissuper)
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
dissuper = defel;
|
2001-07-11 00:09:29 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-07-26 18:38:29 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "inherit") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (dinherit)
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
|
|
|
dinherit = defel;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createrole") == 0)
|
2001-10-25 07:50:21 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dcreaterole)
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
dcreaterole = defel;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createdb") == 0)
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dcreatedb)
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
dcreatedb = defel;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "canlogin") == 0)
|
2001-10-25 07:50:21 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dcanlogin)
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
dcanlogin = defel;
|
2001-07-11 00:09:29 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-12-29 11:05:03 +01:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "isreplication") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (disreplication)
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
|
|
|
disreplication = defel;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-07-31 19:19:22 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "connectionlimit") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (dconnlimit)
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
|
|
|
dconnlimit = defel;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "rolemembers") == 0 &&
|
|
|
|
stmt->action != 0)
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
if (drolemembers)
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
drolemembers = defel;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "validUntil") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (dvalidUntil)
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
|
|
|
dvalidUntil = defel;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
2014-09-19 17:18:35 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "bypassrls") == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (dbypassRLS)
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
|
|
|
|
dbypassRLS = defel;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
else
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
elog(ERROR, "option \"%s\" not recognized",
|
2001-07-11 00:09:29 +02:00
|
|
|
defel->defname);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-12-23 17:46:39 +01:00
|
|
|
if (dpassword && dpassword->arg)
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
password = strVal(dpassword->arg);
|
|
|
|
if (dissuper)
|
|
|
|
issuper = intVal(dissuper->arg);
|
2005-07-26 18:38:29 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dinherit)
|
|
|
|
inherit = intVal(dinherit->arg);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dcreaterole)
|
|
|
|
createrole = intVal(dcreaterole->arg);
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dcreatedb)
|
|
|
|
createdb = intVal(dcreatedb->arg);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dcanlogin)
|
|
|
|
canlogin = intVal(dcanlogin->arg);
|
2010-12-29 11:05:03 +01:00
|
|
|
if (disreplication)
|
|
|
|
isreplication = intVal(disreplication->arg);
|
2005-07-31 19:19:22 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dconnlimit)
|
2009-01-30 18:24:47 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-07-31 19:19:22 +02:00
|
|
|
connlimit = intVal(dconnlimit->arg);
|
2009-01-30 18:24:47 +01:00
|
|
|
if (connlimit < -1)
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("invalid connection limit: %d", connlimit)));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
if (drolemembers)
|
|
|
|
rolemembers = (List *) drolemembers->arg;
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dvalidUntil)
|
|
|
|
validUntil = strVal(dvalidUntil->arg);
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
2014-09-19 17:18:35 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dbypassRLS)
|
|
|
|
bypassrls = intVal(dbypassRLS->arg);
|
2000-01-14 23:11:38 +01:00
|
|
|
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2006-05-04 18:07:29 +02:00
|
|
|
* Scan the pg_authid relation to be certain the user exists.
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-05-04 18:07:29 +02:00
|
|
|
pg_authid_rel = heap_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
pg_authid_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authid_rel);
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
tuple = get_rolespec_tuple(stmt->role);
|
|
|
|
authform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(tuple);
|
|
|
|
rolename = pstrdup(NameStr(authform->rolname));
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
roleid = HeapTupleGetOid(tuple);
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
* To mess with a superuser you gotta be superuser; else you need
|
|
|
|
* createrole, or just want to change your own password
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (authform->rolsuper || issuper >= 0)
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!superuser())
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("must be superuser to alter superusers")));
|
|
|
|
}
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
else if (authform->rolreplication || isreplication >= 0)
|
2010-12-29 11:05:03 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!superuser())
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("must be superuser to alter replication users")));
|
|
|
|
}
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
else if (authform->rolbypassrls || bypassrls >= 0)
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
2014-09-19 17:18:35 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!superuser())
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
2015-05-24 03:35:49 +02:00
|
|
|
errmsg("must be superuser to change bypassrls attribute")));
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
2014-09-19 17:18:35 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
else if (!have_createrole_privilege())
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-07-26 18:38:29 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!(inherit < 0 &&
|
|
|
|
createrole < 0 &&
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
createdb < 0 &&
|
|
|
|
canlogin < 0 &&
|
2010-12-29 11:05:03 +01:00
|
|
|
isreplication < 0 &&
|
2005-07-31 19:19:22 +02:00
|
|
|
!dconnlimit &&
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
!rolemembers &&
|
|
|
|
!validUntil &&
|
2005-12-23 17:46:39 +01:00
|
|
|
dpassword &&
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
roleid == GetUserId()))
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("permission denied")));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-11-18 22:57:56 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Convert validuntil to internal form */
|
|
|
|
if (validUntil)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
validUntil_datum = DirectFunctionCall3(timestamptz_in,
|
|
|
|
CStringGetDatum(validUntil),
|
|
|
|
ObjectIdGetDatum(InvalidOid),
|
|
|
|
Int32GetDatum(-1));
|
|
|
|
validUntil_null = false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* fetch existing setting in case hook needs it */
|
|
|
|
validUntil_datum = SysCacheGetAttr(AUTHNAME, tuple,
|
|
|
|
Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil,
|
|
|
|
&validUntil_null);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Call the password checking hook if there is one defined
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (check_password_hook && password)
|
2015-05-24 03:35:49 +02:00
|
|
|
(*check_password_hook) (rolename,
|
|
|
|
password,
|
|
|
|
isMD5(password) ? PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5 : PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT,
|
|
|
|
validUntil_datum,
|
|
|
|
validUntil_null);
|
2009-11-18 22:57:56 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
* Build an updated tuple, perusing the information just obtained
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
MemSet(new_record, 0, sizeof(new_record));
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
MemSet(new_record_nulls, false, sizeof(new_record_nulls));
|
|
|
|
MemSet(new_record_repl, false, sizeof(new_record_repl));
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-08 17:24:00 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-03-07 05:42:38 +01:00
|
|
|
* issuper/createrole/etc
|
2001-09-08 17:24:00 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (issuper >= 0)
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolsuper - 1] = BoolGetDatum(issuper > 0);
|
|
|
|
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolsuper - 1] = true;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-07-26 18:38:29 +02:00
|
|
|
if (inherit >= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolinherit - 1] = BoolGetDatum(inherit > 0);
|
|
|
|
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolinherit - 1] = true;
|
2005-07-26 18:38:29 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (createrole >= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreaterole - 1] = BoolGetDatum(createrole > 0);
|
|
|
|
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreaterole - 1] = true;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (createdb >= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreatedb - 1] = BoolGetDatum(createdb > 0);
|
|
|
|
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreatedb - 1] = true;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (canlogin >= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcanlogin - 1] = BoolGetDatum(canlogin > 0);
|
|
|
|
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolcanlogin - 1] = true;
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-12-29 11:05:03 +01:00
|
|
|
if (isreplication >= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolreplication - 1] = BoolGetDatum(isreplication > 0);
|
|
|
|
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolreplication - 1] = true;
|
2010-12-29 11:05:03 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-07-31 19:19:22 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dconnlimit)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolconnlimit - 1] = Int32GetDatum(connlimit);
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolconnlimit - 1] = true;
|
2005-07-31 19:19:22 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
/* password */
|
2001-07-11 00:09:29 +02:00
|
|
|
if (password)
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!encrypt_password || isMD5(password))
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] =
|
2008-03-25 23:42:46 +01:00
|
|
|
CStringGetTextDatum(password);
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(password, rolename, strlen(rolename),
|
2005-10-17 18:24:20 +02:00
|
|
|
encrypted_password))
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
elog(ERROR, "password encryption failed");
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] =
|
2008-03-25 23:42:46 +01:00
|
|
|
CStringGetTextDatum(encrypted_password);
|
2001-08-15 20:42:16 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-12-23 17:46:39 +01:00
|
|
|
/* unset password */
|
|
|
|
if (dpassword && dpassword->arg == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
|
|
|
|
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
|
2005-12-23 17:46:39 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
/* valid until */
|
2009-11-18 22:57:56 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_datum;
|
|
|
|
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_null;
|
|
|
|
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = true;
|
2002-03-01 23:45:19 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (bypassrls >= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolbypassrls - 1] = BoolGetDatum(bypassrls > 0);
|
|
|
|
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolbypassrls - 1] = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
2014-09-19 17:18:35 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
new_tuple = heap_modify_tuple(tuple, pg_authid_dsc, new_record,
|
2009-06-11 16:49:15 +02:00
|
|
|
new_record_nulls, new_record_repl);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
simple_heap_update(pg_authid_rel, &tuple->t_self, new_tuple);
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Update indexes */
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
CatalogUpdateIndexes(pg_authid_rel, new_tuple);
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-03-18 03:55:14 +01:00
|
|
|
InvokeObjectPostAlterHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
2000-11-16 23:30:52 +01:00
|
|
|
ReleaseSysCache(tuple);
|
|
|
|
heap_freetuple(new_tuple);
|
|
|
|
|
1999-09-18 21:08:25 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Advance command counter so we can see new record; else tests in
|
|
|
|
* AddRoleMems may fail.
|
1999-09-18 21:08:25 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rolemembers)
|
|
|
|
CommandCounterIncrement();
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (stmt->action == +1) /* add members to role */
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
AddRoleMems(rolename, roleid,
|
|
|
|
rolemembers, roleSpecsToIds(rolemembers),
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
GetUserId(), false);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (stmt->action == -1) /* drop members from role */
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
DelRoleMems(rolename, roleid,
|
|
|
|
rolemembers, roleSpecsToIds(rolemembers),
|
2005-06-28 21:51:26 +02:00
|
|
|
false);
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-09-01 04:54:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit.
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
heap_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock);
|
2012-12-29 13:55:37 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return roleid;
|
1997-12-04 01:34:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-03-01 23:45:19 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* ALTER ROLE ... SET
|
2002-03-01 23:45:19 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-12-29 13:55:37 +01:00
|
|
|
Oid
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
AlterRoleSet(AlterRoleSetStmt *stmt)
|
2002-03-01 23:45:19 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-10-08 00:14:26 +02:00
|
|
|
HeapTuple roletuple;
|
|
|
|
Oid databaseid = InvalidOid;
|
2013-05-29 22:58:43 +02:00
|
|
|
Oid roleid = InvalidOid;
|
2009-10-08 00:14:26 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-18 05:45:36 +01:00
|
|
|
if (stmt->role)
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-04-08 22:56:27 +02:00
|
|
|
check_rolespec_name(stmt->role,
|
|
|
|
"Cannot alter reserved roles.");
|
|
|
|
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
roletuple = get_rolespec_tuple(stmt->role);
|
2013-02-18 05:45:36 +01:00
|
|
|
roleid = HeapTupleGetOid(roletuple);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Obtain a lock on the role and make sure it didn't go away in the
|
|
|
|
* meantime.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
shdepLockAndCheckObject(AuthIdRelationId, HeapTupleGetOid(roletuple));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* To mess with a superuser you gotta be superuser; else you need
|
|
|
|
* createrole, or just want to change your own settings
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (((Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(roletuple))->rolsuper)
|
2013-02-18 05:45:36 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!superuser())
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("must be superuser to alter superusers")));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!have_createrole_privilege() &&
|
2013-02-18 05:45:36 +01:00
|
|
|
HeapTupleGetOid(roletuple) != GetUserId())
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("permission denied")));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ReleaseSysCache(roletuple);
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-03-01 23:45:19 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2009-10-08 00:14:26 +02:00
|
|
|
/* look up and lock the database, if specified */
|
|
|
|
if (stmt->database != NULL)
|
2002-03-01 23:45:19 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-08-05 16:45:09 +02:00
|
|
|
databaseid = get_database_oid(stmt->database, false);
|
2009-10-08 00:14:26 +02:00
|
|
|
shdepLockAndCheckObject(DatabaseRelationId, databaseid);
|
2013-02-18 05:45:36 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!stmt->role)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If no role is specified, then this is effectively the same as
|
|
|
|
* ALTER DATABASE ... SET, so use the same permission check.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!pg_database_ownercheck(databaseid, GetUserId()))
|
|
|
|
aclcheck_error(ACLCHECK_NOT_OWNER, ACL_KIND_DATABASE,
|
|
|
|
stmt->database);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!stmt->role && !stmt->database)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Must be superuser to alter settings globally. */
|
|
|
|
if (!superuser())
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("must be superuser to alter settings globally")));
|
2002-03-01 23:45:19 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-18 05:45:36 +01:00
|
|
|
AlterSetting(databaseid, roleid, stmt->setstmt);
|
2012-12-29 13:55:37 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return roleid;
|
2002-03-01 23:45:19 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-14 23:11:38 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* DROP ROLE
|
2000-01-14 23:11:38 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
DropRole(DropRoleStmt *stmt)
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
Relation pg_authid_rel,
|
|
|
|
pg_auth_members_rel;
|
2004-05-26 06:41:50 +02:00
|
|
|
ListCell *item;
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!have_createrole_privilege())
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
errmsg("permission denied to drop role")));
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
* Scan the pg_authid relation to find the Oid of the role(s) to be
|
2006-05-04 18:07:29 +02:00
|
|
|
* deleted.
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-05-04 18:07:29 +02:00
|
|
|
pg_authid_rel = heap_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
pg_auth_members_rel = heap_open(AuthMemRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
foreach(item, stmt->roles)
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
RoleSpec *rolspec = lfirst(item);
|
|
|
|
char *role;
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
HeapTuple tuple,
|
|
|
|
tmp_tuple;
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
ScanKeyData scankey;
|
2005-07-07 22:40:02 +02:00
|
|
|
char *detail;
|
2008-03-24 20:47:35 +01:00
|
|
|
char *detail_log;
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
SysScanDesc sscan;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
Oid roleid;
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rolspec->roletype != ROLESPEC_CSTRING)
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
|
2015-12-11 04:05:27 +01:00
|
|
|
errmsg("cannot use special role specifier in DROP ROLE")));
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
role = rolspec->rolename;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-02-14 19:42:19 +01:00
|
|
|
tuple = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, PointerGetDatum(role));
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(tuple))
|
2006-02-04 20:06:47 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!stmt->missing_ok)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("role \"%s\" does not exist", role)));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ereport(NOTICE,
|
2006-10-04 02:30:14 +02:00
|
|
|
(errmsg("role \"%s\" does not exist, skipping",
|
2006-02-04 20:06:47 +01:00
|
|
|
role)));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
roleid = HeapTupleGetOid(tuple);
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (roleid == GetUserId())
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_IN_USE),
|
2005-07-26 00:12:34 +02:00
|
|
|
errmsg("current user cannot be dropped")));
|
|
|
|
if (roleid == GetOuterUserId())
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_IN_USE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("current user cannot be dropped")));
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (roleid == GetSessionUserId())
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_IN_USE),
|
2005-07-26 00:12:34 +02:00
|
|
|
errmsg("session user cannot be dropped")));
|
2001-09-08 17:24:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For safety's sake, we allow createrole holders to drop ordinary
|
|
|
|
* roles but not superuser roles. This is mainly to avoid the
|
|
|
|
* scenario where you accidentally drop the last superuser.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (((Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(tuple))->rolsuper &&
|
|
|
|
!superuser())
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("must be superuser to drop superusers")));
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-09 20:34:56 +01:00
|
|
|
/* DROP hook for the role being removed */
|
2013-03-07 02:52:06 +01:00
|
|
|
InvokeObjectDropHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0);
|
2012-03-09 20:34:56 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2001-03-22 07:16:21 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-07-07 22:40:02 +02:00
|
|
|
* Lock the role, so nobody can add dependencies to her while we drop
|
|
|
|
* her. We keep the lock until the end of transaction.
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-07-07 22:40:02 +02:00
|
|
|
LockSharedObject(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0, AccessExclusiveLock);
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-07-07 22:40:02 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Check for pg_shdepend entries depending on this role */
|
2008-03-24 20:47:35 +01:00
|
|
|
if (checkSharedDependencies(AuthIdRelationId, roleid,
|
|
|
|
&detail, &detail_log))
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
2005-07-07 22:40:02 +02:00
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_DEPENDENT_OBJECTS_STILL_EXIST),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("role \"%s\" cannot be dropped because some objects depend on it",
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
role),
|
2011-07-16 20:21:12 +02:00
|
|
|
errdetail_internal("%s", detail),
|
2008-03-24 20:47:35 +01:00
|
|
|
errdetail_log("%s", detail_log)));
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* Remove the role from the pg_authid table
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
simple_heap_delete(pg_authid_rel, &tuple->t_self);
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2000-11-16 23:30:52 +01:00
|
|
|
ReleaseSysCache(tuple);
|
|
|
|
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-05-06 18:12:18 +02:00
|
|
|
* Remove role from the pg_auth_members table. We have to remove all
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* tuples that show it as either a role or a member.
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
*
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* XXX what about grantor entries? Maybe we should do one heap scan.
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
ScanKeyInit(&scankey,
|
|
|
|
Anum_pg_auth_members_roleid,
|
|
|
|
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
|
|
|
|
ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sscan = systable_beginscan(pg_auth_members_rel, AuthMemRoleMemIndexId,
|
Use an MVCC snapshot, rather than SnapshotNow, for catalog scans.
SnapshotNow scans have the undesirable property that, in the face of
concurrent updates, the scan can fail to see either the old or the new
versions of the row. In many cases, we work around this by requiring
DDL operations to hold AccessExclusiveLock on the object being
modified; in some cases, the existing locking is inadequate and random
failures occur as a result. This commit doesn't change anything
related to locking, but will hopefully pave the way to allowing lock
strength reductions in the future.
The major issue has held us back from making this change in the past
is that taking an MVCC snapshot is significantly more expensive than
using a static special snapshot such as SnapshotNow. However, testing
of various worst-case scenarios reveals that this problem is not
severe except under fairly extreme workloads. To mitigate those
problems, we avoid retaking the MVCC snapshot for each new scan;
instead, we take a new snapshot only when invalidation messages have
been processed. The catcache machinery already requires that
invalidation messages be sent before releasing the related heavyweight
lock; else other backends might rely on locally-cached data rather
than scanning the catalog at all. Thus, making snapshot reuse
dependent on the same guarantees shouldn't break anything that wasn't
already subtly broken.
Patch by me. Review by Michael Paquier and Andres Freund.
2013-07-02 15:47:01 +02:00
|
|
|
true, NULL, 1, &scankey);
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
while (HeapTupleIsValid(tmp_tuple = systable_getnext(sscan)))
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
simple_heap_delete(pg_auth_members_rel, &tmp_tuple->t_self);
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-03-22 05:01:46 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
systable_endscan(sscan);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
ScanKeyInit(&scankey,
|
|
|
|
Anum_pg_auth_members_member,
|
|
|
|
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
|
|
|
|
ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sscan = systable_beginscan(pg_auth_members_rel, AuthMemMemRoleIndexId,
|
Use an MVCC snapshot, rather than SnapshotNow, for catalog scans.
SnapshotNow scans have the undesirable property that, in the face of
concurrent updates, the scan can fail to see either the old or the new
versions of the row. In many cases, we work around this by requiring
DDL operations to hold AccessExclusiveLock on the object being
modified; in some cases, the existing locking is inadequate and random
failures occur as a result. This commit doesn't change anything
related to locking, but will hopefully pave the way to allowing lock
strength reductions in the future.
The major issue has held us back from making this change in the past
is that taking an MVCC snapshot is significantly more expensive than
using a static special snapshot such as SnapshotNow. However, testing
of various worst-case scenarios reveals that this problem is not
severe except under fairly extreme workloads. To mitigate those
problems, we avoid retaking the MVCC snapshot for each new scan;
instead, we take a new snapshot only when invalidation messages have
been processed. The catcache machinery already requires that
invalidation messages be sent before releasing the related heavyweight
lock; else other backends might rely on locally-cached data rather
than scanning the catalog at all. Thus, making snapshot reuse
dependent on the same guarantees shouldn't break anything that wasn't
already subtly broken.
Patch by me. Review by Michael Paquier and Andres Freund.
2013-07-02 15:47:01 +02:00
|
|
|
true, NULL, 1, &scankey);
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (HeapTupleIsValid(tmp_tuple = systable_getnext(sscan)))
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
simple_heap_delete(pg_auth_members_rel, &tmp_tuple->t_self);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
systable_endscan(sscan);
|
|
|
|
|
2006-02-12 04:22:21 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2011-07-20 19:18:24 +02:00
|
|
|
* Remove any comments or security labels on this role.
|
2006-02-12 04:22:21 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
DeleteSharedComments(roleid, AuthIdRelationId);
|
2011-07-20 19:18:24 +02:00
|
|
|
DeleteSharedSecurityLabel(roleid, AuthIdRelationId);
|
2006-02-12 04:22:21 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2009-10-08 00:14:26 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Remove settings for this role.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
DropSetting(InvalidOid, roleid);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Advance command counter so that later iterations of this loop will
|
|
|
|
* see the changes already made. This is essential if, for example,
|
|
|
|
* we are trying to drop both a role and one of its direct members ---
|
|
|
|
* we'll get an error if we try to delete the linking pg_auth_members
|
|
|
|
* tuple twice. (We do not need a CCI between the two delete loops
|
|
|
|
* above, because it's not allowed for a role to directly contain
|
|
|
|
* itself.)
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
CommandCounterIncrement();
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-02-26 05:46:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
1999-09-18 21:08:25 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-09-01 04:54:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Now we can clean up; but keep locks until commit.
|
1999-09-18 21:08:25 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
heap_close(pg_auth_members_rel, NoLock);
|
|
|
|
heap_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock);
|
1997-12-04 01:34:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-02-19 18:20:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* Rename role
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
Change many routines to return ObjectAddress rather than OID
The changed routines are mostly those that can be directly called by
ProcessUtilitySlow; the intention is to make the affected object
information more precise, in support for future event trigger changes.
Originally it was envisioned that the OID of the affected object would
be enough, and in most cases that is correct, but upon actually
implementing the event trigger changes it turned out that ObjectAddress
is more widely useful.
Additionally, some command execution routines grew an output argument
that's an object address which provides further info about the executed
command. To wit:
* for ALTER DOMAIN / ADD CONSTRAINT, it corresponds to the address of
the new constraint
* for ALTER OBJECT / SET SCHEMA, it corresponds to the address of the
schema that originally contained the object.
* for ALTER EXTENSION {ADD, DROP} OBJECT, it corresponds to the address
of the object added to or dropped from the extension.
There's no user-visible change in this commit, and no functional change
either.
Discussion: 20150218213255.GC6717@tamriel.snowman.net
Reviewed-By: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund
2015-03-03 18:10:50 +01:00
|
|
|
ObjectAddress
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
RenameRole(const char *oldname, const char *newname)
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2004-05-06 18:59:16 +02:00
|
|
|
HeapTuple oldtuple,
|
|
|
|
newtuple;
|
|
|
|
TupleDesc dsc;
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
Relation rel;
|
2004-05-06 18:59:16 +02:00
|
|
|
Datum datum;
|
|
|
|
bool isnull;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
Datum repl_val[Natts_pg_authid];
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
bool repl_null[Natts_pg_authid];
|
|
|
|
bool repl_repl[Natts_pg_authid];
|
2004-05-06 18:59:16 +02:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
Oid roleid;
|
Change many routines to return ObjectAddress rather than OID
The changed routines are mostly those that can be directly called by
ProcessUtilitySlow; the intention is to make the affected object
information more precise, in support for future event trigger changes.
Originally it was envisioned that the OID of the affected object would
be enough, and in most cases that is correct, but upon actually
implementing the event trigger changes it turned out that ObjectAddress
is more widely useful.
Additionally, some command execution routines grew an output argument
that's an object address which provides further info about the executed
command. To wit:
* for ALTER DOMAIN / ADD CONSTRAINT, it corresponds to the address of
the new constraint
* for ALTER OBJECT / SET SCHEMA, it corresponds to the address of the
schema that originally contained the object.
* for ALTER EXTENSION {ADD, DROP} OBJECT, it corresponds to the address
of the object added to or dropped from the extension.
There's no user-visible change in this commit, and no functional change
either.
Discussion: 20150218213255.GC6717@tamriel.snowman.net
Reviewed-By: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund
2015-03-03 18:10:50 +01:00
|
|
|
ObjectAddress address;
|
2016-04-08 22:56:27 +02:00
|
|
|
Form_pg_authid authform;
|
2004-08-29 07:07:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2006-05-04 18:07:29 +02:00
|
|
|
rel = heap_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
|
2004-05-06 18:59:16 +02:00
|
|
|
dsc = RelationGetDescr(rel);
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2010-02-14 19:42:19 +01:00
|
|
|
oldtuple = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, CStringGetDatum(oldname));
|
2004-05-06 18:59:16 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(oldtuple))
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
errmsg("role \"%s\" does not exist", oldname)));
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* XXX Client applications probably store the session user somewhere, so
|
|
|
|
* renaming it could cause confusion. On the other hand, there may not be
|
|
|
|
* an actual problem besides a little confusion, so think about this and
|
2014-05-06 18:12:18 +02:00
|
|
|
* decide. Same for SET ROLE ... we don't restrict renaming the current
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* effective userid, though.
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
roleid = HeapTupleGetOid(oldtuple);
|
2016-04-08 22:56:27 +02:00
|
|
|
authform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(oldtuple);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (roleid == GetSessionUserId())
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
|
Wording cleanup for error messages. Also change can't -> cannot.
Standard English uses "may", "can", and "might" in different ways:
may - permission, "You may borrow my rake."
can - ability, "I can lift that log."
might - possibility, "It might rain today."
Unfortunately, in conversational English, their use is often mixed, as
in, "You may use this variable to do X", when in fact, "can" is a better
choice. Similarly, "It may crash" is better stated, "It might crash".
2007-02-01 20:10:30 +01:00
|
|
|
errmsg("session user cannot be renamed")));
|
2005-07-26 00:12:34 +02:00
|
|
|
if (roleid == GetOuterUserId())
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
|
Wording cleanup for error messages. Also change can't -> cannot.
Standard English uses "may", "can", and "might" in different ways:
may - permission, "You may borrow my rake."
can - ability, "I can lift that log."
might - possibility, "It might rain today."
Unfortunately, in conversational English, their use is often mixed, as
in, "You may use this variable to do X", when in fact, "can" is a better
choice. Similarly, "It may crash" is better stated, "It might crash".
2007-02-01 20:10:30 +01:00
|
|
|
errmsg("current user cannot be renamed")));
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-04-08 22:56:27 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check that the user is not trying to rename a system role and
|
|
|
|
* not trying to rename a role into the reserved "pg_" namespace.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (IsReservedName(NameStr(authform->rolname)))
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_RESERVED_NAME),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("role name \"%s\" is reserved",
|
|
|
|
NameStr(authform->rolname)),
|
|
|
|
errdetail("Role names starting with \"pg_\" are reserved.")));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (IsReservedName(newname))
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_RESERVED_NAME),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("role name \"%s\" is reserved",
|
|
|
|
newname),
|
|
|
|
errdetail("Role names starting with \"pg_\" are reserved.")));
|
|
|
|
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
/* make sure the new name doesn't exist */
|
2010-02-14 19:42:19 +01:00
|
|
|
if (SearchSysCacheExists1(AUTHNAME, CStringGetDatum(newname)))
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
2003-07-19 01:20:33 +02:00
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_OBJECT),
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
errmsg("role \"%s\" already exists", newname)));
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* createrole is enough privilege unless you want to mess with a superuser
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (((Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(oldtuple))->rolsuper)
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!superuser())
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("must be superuser to rename superusers")));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!have_createrole_privilege())
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("permission denied to rename role")));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
/* OK, construct the modified tuple */
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < Natts_pg_authid; i++)
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
repl_repl[i] = false;
|
2004-05-06 18:59:16 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
repl_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] = true;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
repl_val[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] = DirectFunctionCall1(namein,
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
CStringGetDatum(newname));
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
repl_null[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] = false;
|
2004-05-06 18:59:16 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
datum = heap_getattr(oldtuple, Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword, dsc, &isnull);
|
2004-05-06 18:59:16 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2008-03-25 23:42:46 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!isnull && isMD5(TextDatumGetCString(datum)))
|
2004-05-06 18:59:16 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* MD5 uses the username as salt, so just clear it on a rename */
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
repl_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
|
|
|
|
repl_null[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
|
2004-08-29 07:07:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-05-06 18:59:16 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(NOTICE,
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
(errmsg("MD5 password cleared because of role rename")));
|
2004-05-06 18:59:16 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-08-29 07:07:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
newtuple = heap_modify_tuple(oldtuple, dsc, repl_val, repl_null, repl_repl);
|
2004-05-06 18:59:16 +02:00
|
|
|
simple_heap_update(rel, &oldtuple->t_self, newtuple);
|
2004-08-29 07:07:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-05-06 18:59:16 +02:00
|
|
|
CatalogUpdateIndexes(rel, newtuple);
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-03-18 03:55:14 +01:00
|
|
|
InvokeObjectPostAlterHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
Change many routines to return ObjectAddress rather than OID
The changed routines are mostly those that can be directly called by
ProcessUtilitySlow; the intention is to make the affected object
information more precise, in support for future event trigger changes.
Originally it was envisioned that the OID of the affected object would
be enough, and in most cases that is correct, but upon actually
implementing the event trigger changes it turned out that ObjectAddress
is more widely useful.
Additionally, some command execution routines grew an output argument
that's an object address which provides further info about the executed
command. To wit:
* for ALTER DOMAIN / ADD CONSTRAINT, it corresponds to the address of
the new constraint
* for ALTER OBJECT / SET SCHEMA, it corresponds to the address of the
schema that originally contained the object.
* for ALTER EXTENSION {ADD, DROP} OBJECT, it corresponds to the address
of the object added to or dropped from the extension.
There's no user-visible change in this commit, and no functional change
either.
Discussion: 20150218213255.GC6717@tamriel.snowman.net
Reviewed-By: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund
2015-03-03 18:10:50 +01:00
|
|
|
ObjectAddressSet(address, AuthIdRelationId, roleid);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-06 18:59:16 +02:00
|
|
|
ReleaseSysCache(oldtuple);
|
2006-05-04 18:07:29 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-09-01 04:54:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit.
|
2006-05-04 18:07:29 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
heap_close(rel, NoLock);
|
2012-12-24 00:25:03 +01:00
|
|
|
|
Change many routines to return ObjectAddress rather than OID
The changed routines are mostly those that can be directly called by
ProcessUtilitySlow; the intention is to make the affected object
information more precise, in support for future event trigger changes.
Originally it was envisioned that the OID of the affected object would
be enough, and in most cases that is correct, but upon actually
implementing the event trigger changes it turned out that ObjectAddress
is more widely useful.
Additionally, some command execution routines grew an output argument
that's an object address which provides further info about the executed
command. To wit:
* for ALTER DOMAIN / ADD CONSTRAINT, it corresponds to the address of
the new constraint
* for ALTER OBJECT / SET SCHEMA, it corresponds to the address of the
schema that originally contained the object.
* for ALTER EXTENSION {ADD, DROP} OBJECT, it corresponds to the address
of the object added to or dropped from the extension.
There's no user-visible change in this commit, and no functional change
either.
Discussion: 20150218213255.GC6717@tamriel.snowman.net
Reviewed-By: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund
2015-03-03 18:10:50 +01:00
|
|
|
return address;
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-02-19 18:20:01 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* GrantRoleStmt
|
1998-02-19 18:20:01 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* Grant/Revoke roles to/from roles
|
2000-01-14 23:11:38 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
void
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
GrantRole(GrantRoleStmt *stmt)
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
Relation pg_authid_rel;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
Oid grantor;
|
|
|
|
List *grantee_ids;
|
2004-05-26 06:41:50 +02:00
|
|
|
ListCell *item;
|
2001-07-12 20:03:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (stmt->grantor)
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
grantor = get_rolespec_oid(stmt->grantor, false);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
grantor = GetUserId();
|
2001-07-12 20:03:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
grantee_ids = roleSpecsToIds(stmt->grantee_roles);
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2006-05-04 18:07:29 +02:00
|
|
|
/* AccessShareLock is enough since we aren't modifying pg_authid */
|
|
|
|
pg_authid_rel = heap_open(AuthIdRelationId, AccessShareLock);
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Step through all of the granted roles and add/remove entries for the
|
|
|
|
* grantees, or, if admin_opt is set, then just add/remove the admin
|
|
|
|
* option.
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note: Permissions checking is done by AddRoleMems/DelRoleMems
|
2002-10-21 21:46:45 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
foreach(item, stmt->granted_roles)
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-01-22 21:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
AccessPriv *priv = (AccessPriv *) lfirst(item);
|
|
|
|
char *rolename = priv->priv_name;
|
|
|
|
Oid roleid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Must reject priv(columns) and ALL PRIVILEGES(columns) */
|
|
|
|
if (rolename == NULL || priv->cols != NIL)
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_GRANT_OPERATION),
|
2009-06-11 16:49:15 +02:00
|
|
|
errmsg("column names cannot be included in GRANT/REVOKE ROLE")));
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2010-08-05 16:45:09 +02:00
|
|
|
roleid = get_role_oid(rolename, false);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (stmt->is_grant)
|
|
|
|
AddRoleMems(rolename, roleid,
|
|
|
|
stmt->grantee_roles, grantee_ids,
|
|
|
|
grantor, stmt->admin_opt);
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
else
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
DelRoleMems(rolename, roleid,
|
|
|
|
stmt->grantee_roles, grantee_ids,
|
|
|
|
stmt->admin_opt);
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-29 00:16:45 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2006-05-04 18:07:29 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-09-01 04:54:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit.
|
2006-05-04 18:07:29 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
heap_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2005-11-21 13:49:33 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* DropOwnedObjects
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Drop the objects owned by a given list of roles.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
2006-10-04 02:30:14 +02:00
|
|
|
DropOwnedObjects(DropOwnedStmt *stmt)
|
2005-11-21 13:49:33 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
List *role_ids = roleSpecsToIds(stmt->roles);
|
2005-11-22 19:17:34 +01:00
|
|
|
ListCell *cell;
|
2005-11-21 13:49:33 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check privileges */
|
2005-11-22 19:17:34 +01:00
|
|
|
foreach(cell, role_ids)
|
2005-11-21 13:49:33 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-11-22 19:17:34 +01:00
|
|
|
Oid roleid = lfirst_oid(cell);
|
2005-11-21 13:49:33 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!has_privs_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid))
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("permission denied to drop objects")));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Ok, do it */
|
|
|
|
shdepDropOwned(role_ids, stmt->behavior);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* ReassignOwnedObjects
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Give the objects owned by a given list of roles away to another user.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
2006-10-04 02:30:14 +02:00
|
|
|
ReassignOwnedObjects(ReassignOwnedStmt *stmt)
|
2005-11-21 13:49:33 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
List *role_ids = roleSpecsToIds(stmt->roles);
|
2005-11-21 13:49:33 +01:00
|
|
|
ListCell *cell;
|
|
|
|
Oid newrole;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check privileges */
|
2005-11-22 19:17:34 +01:00
|
|
|
foreach(cell, role_ids)
|
2005-11-21 13:49:33 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-11-22 19:17:34 +01:00
|
|
|
Oid roleid = lfirst_oid(cell);
|
2005-11-21 13:49:33 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!has_privs_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid))
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("permission denied to reassign objects")));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Must have privileges on the receiving side too */
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
newrole = get_rolespec_oid(stmt->newrole, false);
|
2005-11-21 13:49:33 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!has_privs_of_role(GetUserId(), newrole))
|
2005-11-22 19:17:34 +01:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("permission denied to reassign objects")));
|
2005-11-21 13:49:33 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Ok, do it */
|
|
|
|
shdepReassignOwned(role_ids, newrole);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
* roleSpecsToIds
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Given a list of RoleSpecs, generate a list of role OIDs in the same order.
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
*
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
* ROLESPEC_PUBLIC is not allowed.
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-01-24 05:52:40 +01:00
|
|
|
List *
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
roleSpecsToIds(List *memberNames)
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
List *result = NIL;
|
|
|
|
ListCell *l;
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
foreach(l, memberNames)
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-05-24 03:35:49 +02:00
|
|
|
Node *rolespec = (Node *) lfirst(l);
|
|
|
|
Oid roleid;
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
roleid = get_rolespec_oid(rolespec, false);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
result = lappend_oid(result, roleid);
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
return result;
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-14 23:11:38 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* AddRoleMems -- Add given members to the specified role
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* rolename: name of role to add to (used only for error messages)
|
|
|
|
* roleid: OID of role to add to
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
* memberSpecs: list of RoleSpec of roles to add (used only for error messages)
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* memberIds: OIDs of roles to add
|
|
|
|
* grantorId: who is granting the membership
|
|
|
|
* admin_opt: granting admin option?
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
*
|
2006-05-04 18:07:29 +02:00
|
|
|
* Note: caller is responsible for calling auth_file_update_needed().
|
2000-01-14 23:11:38 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
AddRoleMems(const char *rolename, Oid roleid,
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds,
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
Oid grantorId, bool admin_opt)
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
Relation pg_authmem_rel;
|
|
|
|
TupleDesc pg_authmem_dsc;
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
ListCell *specitem;
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
ListCell *iditem;
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
Assert(list_length(memberSpecs) == list_length(memberIds));
|
2000-01-14 23:11:38 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Skip permission check if nothing to do */
|
|
|
|
if (!memberIds)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Check permissions: must have createrole or admin option on the role to
|
2014-05-06 18:12:18 +02:00
|
|
|
* be changed. To mess with a superuser role, you gotta be superuser.
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (superuser_arg(roleid))
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!superuser())
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
errmsg("must be superuser to alter superusers")));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!have_createrole_privilege() &&
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
!is_admin_of_role(grantorId, roleid))
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
errmsg("must have admin option on role \"%s\"",
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
rolename)));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-02-17 15:33:31 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The role membership grantor of record has little significance at
|
|
|
|
* present. Nonetheless, inasmuch as users might look to it for a crude
|
|
|
|
* audit trail, let only superusers impute the grant to a third party.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Before lifting this restriction, give the member == role case of
|
|
|
|
* is_admin_of_role() a fresh look. Ensure that the current role cannot
|
|
|
|
* use an explicit grantor specification to take advantage of the session
|
|
|
|
* user's self-admin right.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (grantorId != GetUserId() && !superuser())
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
2005-10-29 02:31:52 +02:00
|
|
|
errmsg("must be superuser to set grantor")));
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pg_authmem_rel = heap_open(AuthMemRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
pg_authmem_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authmem_rel);
|
2000-11-16 23:30:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
forboth(specitem, memberSpecs, iditem, memberIds)
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
RoleSpec *memberRole = lfirst(specitem);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
Oid memberid = lfirst_oid(iditem);
|
|
|
|
HeapTuple authmem_tuple;
|
|
|
|
HeapTuple tuple;
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
Datum new_record[Natts_pg_auth_members];
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
bool new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_auth_members];
|
|
|
|
bool new_record_repl[Natts_pg_auth_members];
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Refuse creation of membership loops, including the trivial case
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* where a role is made a member of itself. We do this by checking to
|
|
|
|
* see if the target role is already a member of the proposed member
|
2005-11-04 18:25:15 +01:00
|
|
|
* role. We have to ignore possible superuserness, however, else we
|
|
|
|
* could never grant membership in a superuser-privileged role.
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-11-04 18:25:15 +01:00
|
|
|
if (is_member_of_role_nosuper(roleid, memberid))
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_GRANT_OPERATION),
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
(errmsg("role \"%s\" is a member of role \"%s\"",
|
2015-05-24 03:35:49 +02:00
|
|
|
rolename, get_rolespec_name((Node *) memberRole)))));
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Check if entry for this role/member already exists; if so, give
|
|
|
|
* warning unless we are adding admin option.
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-02-14 19:42:19 +01:00
|
|
|
authmem_tuple = SearchSysCache2(AUTHMEMROLEMEM,
|
|
|
|
ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid),
|
|
|
|
ObjectIdGetDatum(memberid));
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (HeapTupleIsValid(authmem_tuple) &&
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
(!admin_opt ||
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
((Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(authmem_tuple))->admin_option))
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(NOTICE,
|
|
|
|
(errmsg("role \"%s\" is already a member of role \"%s\"",
|
2015-05-24 03:35:49 +02:00
|
|
|
get_rolespec_name((Node *) memberRole), rolename)));
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
ReleaseSysCache(authmem_tuple);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Build a tuple to insert or update */
|
|
|
|
MemSet(new_record, 0, sizeof(new_record));
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
MemSet(new_record_nulls, false, sizeof(new_record_nulls));
|
|
|
|
MemSet(new_record_repl, false, sizeof(new_record_repl));
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_roleid - 1] = ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid);
|
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_member - 1] = ObjectIdGetDatum(memberid);
|
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_grantor - 1] = ObjectIdGetDatum(grantorId);
|
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] = BoolGetDatum(admin_opt);
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (HeapTupleIsValid(authmem_tuple))
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_grantor - 1] = true;
|
|
|
|
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] = true;
|
|
|
|
tuple = heap_modify_tuple(authmem_tuple, pg_authmem_dsc,
|
2009-06-11 16:49:15 +02:00
|
|
|
new_record,
|
|
|
|
new_record_nulls, new_record_repl);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
simple_heap_update(pg_authmem_rel, &tuple->t_self, tuple);
|
|
|
|
CatalogUpdateIndexes(pg_authmem_rel, tuple);
|
|
|
|
ReleaseSysCache(authmem_tuple);
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
tuple = heap_form_tuple(pg_authmem_dsc,
|
2009-06-11 16:49:15 +02:00
|
|
|
new_record, new_record_nulls);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
simple_heap_insert(pg_authmem_rel, tuple);
|
|
|
|
CatalogUpdateIndexes(pg_authmem_rel, tuple);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* CCI after each change, in case there are duplicates in list */
|
|
|
|
CommandCounterIncrement();
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-04-12 19:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2002-04-04 06:25:54 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-09-01 04:54:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Close pg_authmem, but keep lock till commit.
|
2002-04-04 06:25:54 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
heap_close(pg_authmem_rel, NoLock);
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* DelRoleMems -- Remove given members from the specified role
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* rolename: name of role to del from (used only for error messages)
|
|
|
|
* roleid: OID of role to del from
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
* memberSpecs: list of RoleSpec of roles to del (used only for error messages)
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* memberIds: OIDs of roles to del
|
|
|
|
* admin_opt: remove admin option only?
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
*
|
2006-05-04 18:07:29 +02:00
|
|
|
* Note: caller is responsible for calling auth_file_update_needed().
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
DelRoleMems(const char *rolename, Oid roleid,
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds,
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
bool admin_opt)
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
Relation pg_authmem_rel;
|
|
|
|
TupleDesc pg_authmem_dsc;
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
ListCell *specitem;
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
ListCell *iditem;
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
Assert(list_length(memberSpecs) == list_length(memberIds));
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Skip permission check if nothing to do */
|
|
|
|
if (!memberIds)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Check permissions: must have createrole or admin option on the role to
|
2014-05-06 18:12:18 +02:00
|
|
|
* be changed. To mess with a superuser role, you gotta be superuser.
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (superuser_arg(roleid))
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!superuser())
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
errmsg("must be superuser to alter superusers")));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-12-23 19:35:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!have_createrole_privilege() &&
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
!is_admin_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid))
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
errmsg("must have admin option on role \"%s\"",
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
rolename)));
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
pg_authmem_rel = heap_open(AuthMemRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
pg_authmem_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authmem_rel);
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
forboth(specitem, memberSpecs, iditem, memberIds)
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
2015-03-09 19:41:54 +01:00
|
|
|
RoleSpec *memberRole = lfirst(specitem);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
Oid memberid = lfirst_oid(iditem);
|
|
|
|
HeapTuple authmem_tuple;
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Find entry for this role/member
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-02-14 19:42:19 +01:00
|
|
|
authmem_tuple = SearchSysCache2(AUTHMEMROLEMEM,
|
|
|
|
ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid),
|
|
|
|
ObjectIdGetDatum(memberid));
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(authmem_tuple))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ereport(WARNING,
|
|
|
|
(errmsg("role \"%s\" is not a member of role \"%s\"",
|
2015-05-24 03:35:49 +02:00
|
|
|
get_rolespec_name((Node *) memberRole), rolename)));
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-10-21 21:46:45 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!admin_opt)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Remove the entry altogether */
|
|
|
|
simple_heap_delete(pg_authmem_rel, &authmem_tuple->t_self);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Just turn off the admin option */
|
|
|
|
HeapTuple tuple;
|
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
Datum new_record[Natts_pg_auth_members];
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
bool new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_auth_members];
|
|
|
|
bool new_record_repl[Natts_pg_auth_members];
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Build a tuple to update with */
|
|
|
|
MemSet(new_record, 0, sizeof(new_record));
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
MemSet(new_record_nulls, false, sizeof(new_record_nulls));
|
|
|
|
MemSet(new_record_repl, false, sizeof(new_record_repl));
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] = BoolGetDatum(false);
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] = true;
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2008-11-02 02:45:28 +01:00
|
|
|
tuple = heap_modify_tuple(authmem_tuple, pg_authmem_dsc,
|
2009-06-11 16:49:15 +02:00
|
|
|
new_record,
|
|
|
|
new_record_nulls, new_record_repl);
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
simple_heap_update(pg_authmem_rel, &tuple->t_self, tuple);
|
|
|
|
CatalogUpdateIndexes(pg_authmem_rel, tuple);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-12-16 18:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
ReleaseSysCache(authmem_tuple);
|
2005-06-29 22:34:15 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* CCI after each change, in case there are duplicates in list */
|
|
|
|
CommandCounterIncrement();
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-04-27 23:24:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2002-10-21 21:46:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-09-01 04:54:52 +02:00
|
|
|
* Close pg_authmem, but keep lock till commit.
|
2002-10-21 21:46:45 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-28 07:09:14 +02:00
|
|
|
heap_close(pg_authmem_rel, NoLock);
|
2003-06-27 16:45:32 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|