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postgresql/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.h

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Postgres95 1.01 Distribution - Virgin Sources
1996-07-09 08:22:35 +02:00
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* fe-auth.h
*
* Definitions for network authentication routines
*
Update copyright for 2024 Reported-by: Michael Paquier Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/ZZKTDPxBBMt3C0J9@paquier.xyz Backpatch-through: 12
2024-01-04 02:49:05 +01:00
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2024, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
Add: * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2000, PostgreSQL, Inc to all files copyright Regents of Berkeley. Man, that's a lot of files.
2000-01-26 06:58:53 +01:00
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
Postgres95 1.01 Distribution - Virgin Sources
1996-07-09 08:22:35 +02:00
*
Remove cvs keywords from all files.
2010-09-20 22:08:53 +02:00
* src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.h
Postgres95 1.01 Distribution - Virgin Sources
1996-07-09 08:22:35 +02:00
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifndef FE_AUTH_H
#define FE_AUTH_H
From: Phil Thompson <phil@river-bank.demon.co.uk> I've completed the patch to fix the protocol and authentication issues I was discussing a couple of weeks ago. The particular changes are: - the protocol has a version number - network byte order is used throughout - the pg_hba.conf file is used to specify what method is used to authenticate a frontend (either password, ident, trust, reject, krb4 or krb5) - support for multiplexed backends is removed - appropriate changes to man pages - the -a switch to many programs to specify an authentication service no longer has any effect - the libpq.so version number has changed to 1.1 The new backend still supports the old protocol so old interfaces won't break.
1998-01-26 02:42:53 +01:00
#include "libpq-fe.h"
Date: Sun, 16 Aug 1998 14:56:48 -0400 From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> Attached is a patch for this weekend's work on libpq. I've dealt with several issues: <for details: see message, in pgsql-patches archive for above data>
1998-08-17 05:50:43 +02:00
#include "libpq-int.h"
From: Phil Thompson <phil@river-bank.demon.co.uk> I've completed the patch to fix the protocol and authentication issues I was discussing a couple of weeks ago. The particular changes are: - the protocol has a version number - network byte order is used throughout - the pg_hba.conf file is used to specify what method is used to authenticate a frontend (either password, ident, trust, reject, krb4 or krb5) - support for multiplexed backends is removed - appropriate changes to man pages - the -a switch to many programs to specify an authentication service no longer has any effect - the libpq.so version number has changed to 1.1 The new backend still supports the old protocol so old interfaces won't break.
1998-01-26 02:42:53 +01:00
Support SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication (RFC 5802 and 7677). This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall protocol. Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later. The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep. That will hopefully be added later. Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification, are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same functionality, anyway. If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user exists, to unauthenticated users. Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file. Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev, and many others. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi
2017-03-07 13:25:40 +01:00
/* Prototypes for functions in fe-auth.c */
Refactor libpq authentication request processing. Move the responsibility of reading the data from the authentication request message from PQconnectPoll() to pg_fe_sendauth(). This way, PQconnectPoll() doesn't need to know about all the different authentication request types, and we don't need the extra fields in the pg_conn struct to pass the data from PQconnectPoll() to pg_fe_sendauth() anymore. Reviewed by Michael Paquier. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/6490b975-5ee1-6280-ac1d-af975b19fb9a%40iki.fi
2017-04-13 18:34:14 +02:00
extern int pg_fe_sendauth(AuthRequest areq, int payloadlen, PGconn *conn);
Clean up messy API for src/port/thread.c. The point of this patch is to reduce inclusion spam by not needing to #include <netdb.h> or <pwd.h> in port.h (which is read by every compile in our tree). To do that, we must remove port.h's declarations of pqGetpwuid and pqGethostbyname. pqGethostbyname is only used, and is only ever likely to be used, in src/port/getaddrinfo.c --- which isn't even built on most platforms, making pqGethostbyname dead code for most people. Hence, deal with that by just moving it into getaddrinfo.c. To clean up pqGetpwuid, invent a couple of simple wrapper functions with less-messy APIs. This allows removing some duplicate error-handling code, too. In passing, remove thread.c from the MSVC build, since it contains nothing we use on Windows. Noted while working on 376ce3e40. Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/1634252654444.90107@mit.edu
2022-01-11 19:46:12 +01:00
extern char *pg_fe_getusername(uid_t user_id, PQExpBuffer errorMessage);
Fix libpq's behavior when /etc/passwd isn't readable. Some users run their applications in chroot environments that lack an /etc/passwd file. This means that the current UID's user name and home directory are not obtainable. libpq used to be all right with that, so long as the database role name to use was specified explicitly. But commit a4c8f14364c27508233f8a31ac4b10a4c90235a9 broke such cases by causing any failure of pg_fe_getauthname() to be treated as a hard error. In any case it did little to advance its nominal goal of causing errors in pg_fe_getauthname() to be reported better. So revert that and instead put some real error-reporting code in place. This requires changes to the APIs of pg_fe_getauthname() and pqGetpwuid(), since the latter had departed from the POSIX-specified API of getpwuid_r() in a way that made it impossible to distinguish actual lookup errors from "no such user". To allow such failures to be reported, while not failing if the caller supplies a role name, add a second call of pg_fe_getauthname() in connectOptions2(). This is a tad ugly, and could perhaps be avoided with some refactoring of PQsetdbLogin(), but I'll leave that idea for later. (Note that the complained-of misbehavior only occurs in PQsetdbLogin, not when using the PQconnect functions, because in the latter we will never bother to call pg_fe_getauthname() if the user gives a role name.) In passing also clean up the Windows-side usage of GetUserName(): the recommended buffer size is 257 bytes, the passed buffer length should be the buffer size not buffer size less 1, and any error is reported by GetLastError() not errno. Per report from Christoph Berg. Back-patch to 9.4 where the chroot failure case was introduced. The generally poor reporting of errors here is of very long standing, of course, but given the lack of field complaints about it we won't risk changing these APIs further back (even though they're theoretically internal to libpq).
2015-01-11 18:35:44 +01:00
extern char *pg_fe_getauthname(PQExpBuffer errorMessage);
Another pgindent run. Fixes enum indenting, and improves #endif spacing. Also adds space for one-line comments.
2001-10-28 07:26:15 +01:00
Refactor SASL code with a generic interface for its mechanisms The code of SCRAM and SASL have been tightly linked together since SCRAM exists in the core code, making hard to apprehend the addition of new SASL mechanisms, but these are by design different facilities, with SCRAM being an option for SASL. This refactors the code related to both so as the backend and the frontend use a set of callbacks for SASL mechanisms, documenting while on it what is expected by anybody adding a new SASL mechanism. The separation between both layers is neat, using two sets of callbacks for the frontend and the backend to mark the frontier between both facilities. The shape of the callbacks is now directly inspired from the routines used by SCRAM, so the code change is straight-forward, and the SASL code is moved into its own set of files. These will likely change depending on how and if new SASL mechanisms get added in the future. Author: Jacob Champion Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/3d2a6f5d50e741117d6baf83eb67ebf1a8a35a11.camel@vmware.com
2021-07-07 03:55:15 +02:00
/* Mechanisms in fe-auth-scram.c */
extern const pg_fe_sasl_mech pg_scram_mech;
Improve error handling of HMAC computations This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation: - The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by cryptohashes. - For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect. Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now. Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose. Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
extern char *pg_fe_scram_build_secret(const char *password,
Make SCRAM iteration count configurable Replace the hardcoded value with a GUC such that the iteration count can be raised in order to increase protection against brute-force attacks. The hardcoded value for SCRAM iteration count was defined to be 4096, which is taken from RFC 7677, so set the default for the GUC to 4096 to match. In RFC 7677 the recommendation is at least 15000 iterations but 4096 is listed as a SHOULD requirement given that it's estimated to yield a 0.5s processing time on a mobile handset of the time of RFC writing (late 2015). Raising the iteration count of SCRAM will make stored passwords more resilient to brute-force attacks at a higher computational cost during connection establishment. Lowering the count will reduce computational overhead during connections at the tradeoff of reducing strength against brute-force attacks. There are however platforms where even a modest iteration count yields a too high computational overhead, with weaker password encryption schemes chosen as a result. In these situations, SCRAM with a very low iteration count still gives benefits over weaker schemes like md5, so we allow the iteration count to be set to one at the low end. The new GUC is intentionally generically named such that it can be made to support future SCRAM standards should they emerge. At that point the value can be made into key:value pairs with an undefined key as a default which will be backwards compatible with this. Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> Reviewed-by: Jonathan S. Katz <jkatz@postgresql.org> Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/F72E7BC7-189F-4B17-BF47-9735EB72C364@yesql.se
2023-03-27 09:46:29 +02:00
int iterations,
Improve error handling of HMAC computations This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation: - The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by cryptohashes. - For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect. Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now. Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose. Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
const char **errstr);
Support SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication (RFC 5802 and 7677). This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall protocol. Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later. The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep. That will hopefully be added later. Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification, are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same functionality, anyway. If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user exists, to unauthenticated users. Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file. Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev, and many others. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi
2017-03-07 13:25:40 +01:00
Postgres95 1.01 Distribution - Virgin Sources
1996-07-09 08:22:35 +02:00
#endif /* FE_AUTH_H */