This parameter can be used to enforce the channel binding type used
during a SCRAM authentication. This can be useful to check code paths
where an invalid channel binding type is used by a client and will be
even more useful to allow testing other channel binding types when they
are added.
The default value is tls-unique, which is what RFC 5802 specifies.
Clients can optionally specify an empty value, which has as effect to
not use channel binding and use SCRAM-SHA-256 as chosen SASL mechanism.
More tests for SCRAM and channel binding are added to the SSL test
suite.
Author: Author: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
Mechanism names for SCRAM and channel binding names have been included
in scram.h by the libpq frontend code, and this header references a set
of routines which are only used by the backend. scram-common.h is on
the contrary usable by both the backend and libpq, so getting those
names from there seems more reasonable.
Author: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
We need to check whether the channel-binding flag encoded in the
client-final-message is the same one sent in the client-first-message.
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
This is the basic feature set using OpenSSL to support the feature. In
order to allow the frontend and the backend to fetch the sent and
expected TLS Finished messages, a PG-like API is added to be able to
make the interface pluggable for other SSL implementations.
This commit also adds a infrastructure to facilitate the addition of
future channel binding types as well as libpq parameters to control the
SASL mechanism names and channel binding names. Those will be added by
upcoming commits.
Some tests are added to the SSL test suite to test SCRAM authentication
with channel binding.
Author: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>
Don't move parenthesized lines to the left, even if that means they
flow past the right margin.
By default, BSD indent lines up statement continuation lines that are
within parentheses so that they start just to the right of the preceding
left parenthesis. However, traditionally, if that resulted in the
continuation line extending to the right of the desired right margin,
then indent would push it left just far enough to not overrun the margin,
if it could do so without making the continuation line start to the left of
the current statement indent. That makes for a weird mix of indentations
unless one has been completely rigid about never violating the 80-column
limit.
This behavior has been pretty universally panned by Postgres developers.
Hence, disable it with indent's new -lpl switch, so that parenthesized
lines are always lined up with the preceding left paren.
This patch is much less interesting than the first round of indent
changes, but also bulkier, so I thought it best to separate the effects.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/E1dAmxK-0006EE-1r@gemulon.postgresql.org
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/30527.1495162840@sss.pgh.pa.us
The nonce consists of client and server nonces concatenated together. The
client checks the nonce contained the client nonce, but it would get fooled
if the server sent a truncated or even empty nonce.
Reported by Steven Fackler to security@postgresql.org. Neither me or Steven
are sure what harm a malicious server could do with this, but let's fix it.
In the backend, this is just to silence coverity warnings, but in the
frontend, it's a genuine leak, even if extremely rare.
Spotted by Coverity, patch by Michael Paquier.
* Remove is_scram_verifier() function. It was unused.
* Fix sanitize_char() function, used in error messages on protocol
violations, to print bytes >= 0x7F correctly.
* Change spelling of scram_MockSalt() function to be more consistent with
the surroundings.
* Change a few more references to "server proof" to "server signature" that
I missed in commit d981074c24.
* Move computation of SaltedPassword to a separate function from
scram_ClientOrServerKey(). This saves a lot of cycles in libpq, by
computing SaltedPassword only once per authentication. (Computing
SaltedPassword is expensive by design.)
* Split scram_ClientOrServerKey() into two functions. Improves
readability, by making the calling code less verbose.
* Rename "server proof" to "server signature", to better match the
nomenclature used in RFC 5802.
* Rename SCRAM_SALT_LEN to SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, to make it more clear
that the salt can be of any length, and the constant only specifies how
long a salt we use when we generate a new verifier. Also rename
SCRAM_ITERATIONS_DEFAULT to SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, for consistency.
These things caught my eye while working on other upcoming changes.
An important step of SASLprep normalization, is to convert the string to
Unicode normalization form NFKC. Unicode normalization requires a fairly
large table of character decompositions, which is generated from data
published by the Unicode consortium. The script to generate the table is
put in src/common/unicode, as well test code for the normalization.
A pre-generated version of the tables is included in src/include/common,
so you don't need the code in src/common/unicode to build PostgreSQL, only
if you wish to modify the normalization tables.
The SASLprep implementation depends on the UTF-8 functions from
src/backend/utils/mb/wchar.c. So to use it, you must also compile and link
that. That doesn't change anything for the current users of these
functions, the backend and libpq, as they both already link with wchar.o.
It would be good to move those functions into a separate file in
src/commmon, but I'll leave that for another day.
No documentation changes included, because there is no details on the
SCRAM mechanism in the docs anyway. An overview on that in the protocol
specification would probably be good, even though SCRAM is documented in
detail in RFC5802. I'll write that as a separate patch. An important thing
to mention there is that we apply SASLprep even on invalid UTF-8 strings,
to support other encodings.
Patch by Michael Paquier and me.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSByyEmAVLtEf1KxTRh=PWNKiWKEKQR=e1yGehz=wbymQ@mail.gmail.com
It was not used for what the comment claimed, at all. It was actually used
as the 'base' argument to strtol(), when reading the iteration count. We
don't need a constant for base-10, so remove it.
This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the
GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL
authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL
messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage
messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows
adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall
protocol.
Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later.
The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet
implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with
non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep.
That will hopefully be added later.
Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification,
are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same
functionality, anyway.
If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing
an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from
a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is
created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these
motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user
exists, to unauthenticated users.
Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file.
Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different
stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev,
and many others.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi