This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the
GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL
authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL
messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage
messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows
adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall
protocol.
Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later.
The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet
implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with
non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep.
That will hopefully be added later.
Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification,
are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same
functionality, anyway.
If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing
an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from
a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is
created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these
motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user
exists, to unauthenticated users.
Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file.
Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different
stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev,
and many others.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi
Formerly an alternate password file could only be selected via the
environment variable PGPASSFILE; now it can also be selected via a
new connection parameter "passfile", corresponding to the conventions
for most other connection parameters. There was some concern about
this creating a security weakness, but it was agreed that that argument
was pretty thin, and there are clear use-cases for handling password
files this way.
Julian Markwort, reviewed by Fabien Coelho, some adjustments by me
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/a4b4f4f1-7b58-a0e8-5268-5f7db8e8ccaa@uni-muenster.de
Avoid memory leak in conninfo_uri_parse_options. Use the current host
rather than the comma-separated list of host names when the host name
is needed for GSS, SSPI, or SSL authentication. Document the way
connect_timeout interacts with multiple host specifications.
Takayuki Tsunakawa
It's also possible to specify a separate port for each host.
Previously, we'd loop over every address returned by looking up the
host name; now, we'll try every address for every host name.
Patch by me. Victor Wagner wrote an earlier patch for this feature,
which I read, but I didn't use any of his code. Review by Mithun Cy.
When building libpq, ip.c and md5.c were symlinked or copied from
src/backend/libpq into src/interfaces/libpq, but now that we have a
directory specifically for routines that are shared between the server and
client binaries, src/common/, move them there.
Some routines in ip.c were only used in the backend. Keep those in
src/backend/libpq, but rename to ifaddr.c to avoid confusion with the file
that's now in common.
Fix the comment in src/common/Makefile to reflect how libpq actually links
those files.
There are two more files that libpq symlinks directly from src/backend:
encnames.c and wchar.c. I don't feel compelled to move those right now,
though.
Patch by Michael Paquier, with some changes by me.
Discussion: <69938195-9c76-8523-0af8-eb718ea5b36e@iki.fi>
Whenever this function is used with the FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM flag,
it's good practice to include FORMAT_MESSAGE_IGNORE_INSERTS as well.
Otherwise, if the message contains any %n insertion markers, the function
will try to fetch argument strings to substitute --- which we are not
passing, possibly leading to a crash. This is exactly analogous to the
rule about not giving printf() a format string you're not in control of.
Noted and patched by Christian Ullrich.
Back-patch to all supported branches.
Some users run their applications in chroot environments that lack an
/etc/passwd file. This means that the current UID's user name and home
directory are not obtainable. libpq used to be all right with that,
so long as the database role name to use was specified explicitly.
But commit a4c8f14364 broke such cases by
causing any failure of pg_fe_getauthname() to be treated as a hard error.
In any case it did little to advance its nominal goal of causing errors
in pg_fe_getauthname() to be reported better. So revert that and instead
put some real error-reporting code in place. This requires changes to the
APIs of pg_fe_getauthname() and pqGetpwuid(), since the latter had
departed from the POSIX-specified API of getpwuid_r() in a way that made
it impossible to distinguish actual lookup errors from "no such user".
To allow such failures to be reported, while not failing if the caller
supplies a role name, add a second call of pg_fe_getauthname() in
connectOptions2(). This is a tad ugly, and could perhaps be avoided with
some refactoring of PQsetdbLogin(), but I'll leave that idea for later.
(Note that the complained-of misbehavior only occurs in PQsetdbLogin,
not when using the PQconnect functions, because in the latter we will
never bother to call pg_fe_getauthname() if the user gives a role name.)
In passing also clean up the Windows-side usage of GetUserName(): the
recommended buffer size is 257 bytes, the passed buffer length should
be the buffer size not buffer size less 1, and any error is reported
by GetLastError() not errno.
Per report from Christoph Berg. Back-patch to 9.4 where the chroot
failure case was introduced. The generally poor reporting of errors
here is of very long standing, of course, but given the lack of field
complaints about it we won't risk changing these APIs further back
(even though they're theoretically internal to libpq).
krb5 has been deprecated since 8.3, and the recommended way to do
Kerberos authentication is using the GSSAPI authentication method
(which is still fully supported).
libpq retains the ability to identify krb5 authentication, but only
gives an error message about it being unsupported. Since all authentication
is initiated from the backend, there is no need to keep it at all
in the backend.
Previously missing or invalid service files returned NULL. Also fix
pg_upgrade to report "out of memory" for a null return from
PQconndefaults().
Patch by Steve Singer, rewritten by me
asprintf(), aside from not being particularly portable, has a fundamentally
badly-designed API; the psprintf() function that was added in passing in
the previous patch has a much better API choice. Moreover, the NetBSD
implementation that was borrowed for the previous patch doesn't work with
non-C99-compliant vsnprintf, which is something we still have to cope with
on some platforms; and it depends on va_copy which isn't all that portable
either. Get rid of that code in favor of an implementation similar to what
we've used for many years in stringinfo.c. Also, move it into libpgcommon
since it's not really libpgport material.
I think this patch will be enough to turn the buildfarm green again, but
there's still cosmetic work left to do, namely get rid of pg_asprintf()
in favor of using psprintf(). That will come in a followon patch.
Add asprintf(), pg_asprintf(), and psprintf() to simplify string
allocation and composition. Replacement implementations taken from
NetBSD.
Reviewed-by: Álvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>
Reviewed-by: Asif Naeem <anaeem.it@gmail.com>
It turns out the reason we hadn't found out about the portability issues
with our credential-control-message code is that almost no modern platforms
use that code at all; the ones that used to need it now offer getpeereid(),
which we choose first. The last holdout was NetBSD, and they added
getpeereid() as of 5.0. So far as I can tell, the only live platform on
which that code was being exercised was Debian/kFreeBSD, ie, FreeBSD kernel
with Linux userland --- since glibc doesn't provide getpeereid(), we fell
back to the control message code. However, the FreeBSD kernel provides a
LOCAL_PEERCRED socket parameter that's functionally equivalent to Linux's
SO_PEERCRED. That is both much simpler to use than control messages, and
superior because it doesn't require receiving a message from the other end
at just the right time.
Therefore, add code to use LOCAL_PEERCRED when necessary, and rip out all
the credential-control-message code in the backend. (libpq still has such
code so that it can still talk to pre-9.1 servers ... but eventually we can
get rid of it there too.) Clean up related autoconf probes, too.
This means that libpq's requirepeer parameter now works on exactly the same
platforms where the backend supports peer authentication, so adjust the
documentation accordingly.
Even though our existing code for handling credentials control messages has
been basically unchanged since 2001, it was fundamentally wrong: it did not
ensure proper alignment of the supplied buffer, and it was calculating
buffer sizes and message sizes incorrectly. This led to failures on
platforms where alignment padding is relevant, for instance FreeBSD on
64-bit platforms, as seen in a recent Debian bug report passed on by
Martin Pitt (http://bugs.debian.org//cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=612888).
Rewrite to do the message-whacking using the macros specified in RFC 2292,
following a suggestion from Theo de Raadt in that thread. Tested by me
on Debian/kFreeBSD-amd64; since OpenBSD and NetBSD document the identical
CMSG API, it should work there too.
Back-patch to all supported branches.
This warning is new in gcc 4.6 and part of -Wall. This patch cleans
up most of the noise, but there are some still warnings that are
trickier to remove.
parameter against server cert's CN field) to succeed in the case where
both host and hostaddr are specified. As with the existing precedents
for Kerberos, GSSAPI, SSPI, it is the calling application's responsibility
that host and hostaddr match up --- we just use the host name as given.
Per bug #5559 from Christopher Head.
In passing, make the error handling and messages for the no-host-name-given
failure more consistent among these four cases, and correct a lie in the
documentation: we don't attempt to reverse-lookup host from hostaddr
if host is missing.
Back-patch to 8.4 where SSL cert verification was introduced.
now always use the system username as the default, and not try to pick it up
from the kerberos ticket.
This fixes the spurious error messages that show up on kerberos-enabled builds
when not actually using kerberos, and puts it in line with how other authentication
methods work.
work with the PQExpBuffer code instead of fighting it. This avoids an
unnecessary limit on message length and fixes the latent bug that
errorMessage.len wasn't getting set.
PQconnectionNeedsPassword function that tells the right thing for whether to
prompt for a password, and improve PQconnectionUsedPassword so that it checks
whether the password used by the connection was actually supplied as a
connection argument, instead of coming from environment or a password file.
Per bug report from Mark Cave-Ayland and subsequent discussion.
Heikki Linnakangas
Tom Lane
Bruce Momjian
Robert Haas
Magnus Hagander
Peter Eisentraut