postgresql/src/backend/libpq
Thomas Munro b59d4d6c36 Fix const correctness warning.
Per buildfarm.
2018-11-13 19:03:02 +13:00
..
Makefile Add ssl_passphrase_command setting 2018-03-17 08:28:51 -04:00
README.SSL Move EDH support to common files 2018-01-23 07:11:38 -05:00
auth-scram.c Minor cleanup/future-proofing for pg_saslprep(). 2018-09-08 18:20:36 -04:00
auth.c Fix const correctness warning. 2018-11-13 19:03:02 +13:00
be-fsstubs.c Update copyright for 2018 2018-01-02 23:30:12 -05:00
be-secure-common.c Post-feature-freeze pgindent run. 2018-04-26 14:47:16 -04:00
be-secure-openssl.c Remove duplicated words split across lines in comments 2018-09-08 12:24:19 -07:00
be-secure.c Server-side fix for delayed NOTIFY and SIGTERM processing. 2018-10-19 21:39:21 -04:00
crypt.c Update copyright for 2018 2018-01-02 23:30:12 -05:00
hba.c Fix possible buffer overrun in hba.c. 2018-11-13 16:27:13 +13:00
ifaddr.c Update copyright for 2018 2018-01-02 23:30:12 -05:00
pg_hba.conf.sample Rename "scram" to "scram-sha-256" in pg_hba.conf and password_encryption. 2017-04-18 14:50:50 +03:00
pg_ident.conf.sample Reformat the comments in pg_hba.conf and pg_ident.conf 2010-01-26 06:58:39 +00:00
pqcomm.c Correct constness of a few variables. 2018-10-15 21:01:14 -07:00
pqformat.c C comments: "a" <--> "an" corrections 2018-03-29 15:18:53 -04:00
pqmq.c Correct constness of a few variables. 2018-10-15 21:01:14 -07:00
pqsignal.c Update copyright for 2018 2018-01-02 23:30:12 -05:00

README.SSL

src/backend/libpq/README.SSL

SSL
===

>From the servers perspective:


  Receives StartupPacket
           |
           |
 (Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) -----------  Normal startup
           |                  No
           |
           | Yes
           |
           |
 (Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
           |                       No        |
           |                                 |
           | Yes                         Normal startup
           |
           |
        Send 'S'
           |
           |
      Establish SSL
           |
           |
      Normal startup





>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):


      Connect
         |
         |
  Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
         |
         |
  Receive single char  ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
         |                                       |
         | '<else>'                              |
         |                                  Normal startup
         |
         |
   Is it 'E' for error  ------------------- Retry connection
         |                  Yes             without SSL
         | No
         |
   Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
         |                  Yes
         |
   Fail with unknown

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ephemeral DH
============

Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
server's private key.  Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).

N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.

Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
use DSA keys.  DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
are unacceptable.

The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
if there's a problem establishing an SSL session.  In this case you'll
need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).