582edc369c
This makes the client programs behave as documented regardless of the connect-time search_path and regardless of user-created objects. Today, a malicious user with CREATE permission on a search_path schema can take control of certain of these clients' queries and invoke arbitrary SQL functions under the client identity, often a superuser. This is exploitable in the default configuration, where all users have CREATE privilege on schema "public". This changes behavior of user-defined code stored in the database, like pg_index.indexprs and pg_extension_config_dump(). If they reach code bearing unqualified names, "does not exist" or "no schema has been selected to create in" errors might appear. Users may fix such errors by schema-qualifying affected names. After upgrading, consider watching server logs for these errors. The --table arguments of src/bin/scripts clients have been lax; for example, "vacuumdb -Zt pg_am\;CHECKPOINT" performed a checkpoint. That now fails, but for now, "vacuumdb -Zt 'pg_am(amname);CHECKPOINT'" still performs a checkpoint. Back-patch to 9.3 (all supported versions). Reviewed by Tom Lane, though this fix strategy was not his first choice. Reported by Arseniy Sharoglazov. Security: CVE-2018-1058 |
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| .. | ||
| po | ||
| t | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| Makefile | ||
| clusterdb.c | ||
| common.c | ||
| common.h | ||
| createdb.c | ||
| createuser.c | ||
| dropdb.c | ||
| dropuser.c | ||
| nls.mk | ||
| pg_isready.c | ||
| reindexdb.c | ||
| vacuumdb.c | ||