postgresql/src/backend/libpq/hba.c

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/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* hba.c
* Routines to handle host based authentication (that's the scheme
* wherein you authenticate a user by seeing what IP address the system
* says he comes from and possibly using ident).
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2006, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/libpq/hba.c,v 1.153 2006/07/10 16:20:50 alvherre Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include "postgres.h"
#include <ctype.h>
#include <pwd.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED)
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/ucred.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "libpq/libpq.h"
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#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
#include "storage/fd.h"
#include "utils/flatfiles.h"
#include "utils/guc.h"
#define atooid(x) ((Oid) strtoul((x), NULL, 10))
#define atoxid(x) ((TransactionId) strtoul((x), NULL, 10))
/* Max size of username ident server can return */
#define IDENT_USERNAME_MAX 512
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/* Standard TCP port number for Ident service. Assigned by IANA */
#define IDENT_PORT 113
/* This is used to separate values in multi-valued column strings */
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#define MULTI_VALUE_SEP "\001"
#define MAX_TOKEN 256
/*
* These variables hold the pre-parsed contents of the hba and ident
* configuration files, as well as the flat auth file.
* Each is a list of sublists, one sublist for
* each (non-empty, non-comment) line of the file. Each sublist's
* first item is an integer line number (so we can give somewhat-useful
* location info in error messages). Remaining items are palloc'd strings,
* one string per token on the line. Note there will always be at least
* one token, since blank lines are not entered in the data structure.
*/
/* pre-parsed content of HBA config file and corresponding line #s */
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static List *hba_lines = NIL;
static List *hba_line_nums = NIL;
/* pre-parsed content of ident usermap file and corresponding line #s */
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static List *ident_lines = NIL;
static List *ident_line_nums = NIL;
/* pre-parsed content of flat auth file and corresponding line #s */
static List *role_lines = NIL;
static List *role_line_nums = NIL;
/* sorted entries so we can do binary search lookups */
static List **role_sorted = NULL; /* sorted role list, for bsearch() */
static int role_length;
static void tokenize_file(const char *filename, FILE *file,
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List **lines, List **line_nums);
static char *tokenize_inc_file(const char *outer_filename,
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const char *inc_filename);
/*
* isblank() exists in the ISO C99 spec, but it's not very portable yet,
* so provide our own version.
*/
static bool
pg_isblank(const char c)
{
return c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\r';
}
/*
* Grab one token out of fp. Tokens are strings of non-blank
* characters bounded by blank characters, commas, beginning of line, and
* end of line. Blank means space or tab. Tokens can be delimited by
* double quotes (and usually are, in current usage).
*
* The token, if any, is returned at *buf (a buffer of size bufsz).
*
* If successful: store null-terminated token at *buf and return TRUE.
* If no more tokens on line: set *buf = '\0' and return FALSE.
*
* Leave file positioned at the character immediately after the token or EOF,
* whichever comes first. If no more tokens on line, position the file to the
* beginning of the next line or EOF, whichever comes first.
*
* Handle comments. Treat unquoted keywords that might be role names or
* database names specially, by appending a newline to them.
*/
static bool
next_token(FILE *fp, char *buf, int bufsz)
{
int c;
char *start_buf = buf;
char *end_buf = buf + (bufsz - 2);
bool in_quote = false;
bool was_quote = false;
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bool saw_quote = false;
Assert(end_buf > start_buf);
/* Move over initial whitespace and commas */
while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF && (pg_isblank(c) || c == ','))
;
if (c == EOF || c == '\n')
{
*buf = '\0';
return false;
}
/*
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* Build a token in buf of next characters up to EOF, EOL, unquoted comma,
* or unquoted whitespace.
*/
while (c != EOF && c != '\n' &&
(!pg_isblank(c) || in_quote == true))
{
/* skip comments to EOL */
if (c == '#' && !in_quote)
{
while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF && c != '\n')
;
/* If only comment, consume EOL too; return EOL */
if (c != EOF && buf == start_buf)
c = getc(fp);
break;
}
if (buf >= end_buf)
{
*buf = '\0';
ereport(LOG,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
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errmsg("authentication file token too long, skipping: \"%s\"",
start_buf)));
/* Discard remainder of line */
while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF && c != '\n')
;
break;
}
if (c != '"' || (c == '"' && was_quote))
*buf++ = c;
/* We pass back the comma so the caller knows there is more */
if ((pg_isblank(c) || c == ',') && !in_quote)
break;
/* Literal double-quote is two double-quotes */
if (in_quote && c == '"')
was_quote = !was_quote;
else
was_quote = false;
if (c == '"')
{
in_quote = !in_quote;
saw_quote = true;
}
c = getc(fp);
}
/*
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* Put back the char right after the token (critical in case it is EOL,
* since we need to detect end-of-line at next call).
*/
if (c != EOF)
ungetc(c, fp);
*buf = '\0';
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if (!saw_quote &&
(strcmp(start_buf, "all") == 0 ||
strcmp(start_buf, "sameuser") == 0 ||
strcmp(start_buf, "samegroup") == 0 ||
strcmp(start_buf, "samerole") == 0))
{
/* append newline to a magical keyword */
*buf++ = '\n';
*buf = '\0';
}
return (saw_quote || buf > start_buf);
}
/*
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* Tokenize file and handle file inclusion and comma lists. We have
* to break apart the commas to expand any file names then
* reconstruct with commas.
*
* The result is a palloc'd string, or NULL if we have reached EOL.
*/
static char *
next_token_expand(const char *filename, FILE *file)
{
char buf[MAX_TOKEN];
char *comma_str = pstrdup("");
bool got_something = false;
bool trailing_comma;
char *incbuf;
int needed;
do
{
if (!next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf)))
break;
got_something = true;
if (strlen(buf) > 0 && buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == ',')
{
trailing_comma = true;
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buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
}
else
trailing_comma = false;
/* Is this referencing a file? */
if (buf[0] == '@')
incbuf = tokenize_inc_file(filename, buf + 1);
else
incbuf = pstrdup(buf);
needed = strlen(comma_str) + strlen(incbuf) + 1;
if (trailing_comma)
needed++;
comma_str = repalloc(comma_str, needed);
strcat(comma_str, incbuf);
if (trailing_comma)
strcat(comma_str, MULTI_VALUE_SEP);
pfree(incbuf);
} while (trailing_comma);
if (!got_something)
{
pfree(comma_str);
return NULL;
}
return comma_str;
}
/*
* Free memory used by lines/tokens (i.e., structure built by tokenize_file)
*/
static void
free_lines(List **lines, List **line_nums)
{
/*
* Either both must be non-NULL, or both must be NULL
*/
Assert((*lines != NIL && *line_nums != NIL) ||
(*lines == NIL && *line_nums == NIL));
if (*lines)
{
/*
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* "lines" is a list of lists; each of those sublists consists of
* palloc'ed tokens, so we want to free each pointed-to token in a
* sublist, followed by the sublist itself, and finally the whole
* list.
*/
ListCell *line;
foreach(line, *lines)
{
List *ln = lfirst(line);
ListCell *token;
foreach(token, ln)
pfree(lfirst(token));
/* free the sublist structure itself */
list_free(ln);
}
/* free the list structure itself */
list_free(*lines);
/* clear the static variable */
*lines = NIL;
}
if (*line_nums)
{
list_free(*line_nums);
*line_nums = NIL;
}
}
static char *
tokenize_inc_file(const char *outer_filename,
const char *inc_filename)
{
char *inc_fullname;
FILE *inc_file;
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List *inc_lines;
List *inc_line_nums;
ListCell *line;
char *comma_str;
if (is_absolute_path(inc_filename))
{
/* absolute path is taken as-is */
inc_fullname = pstrdup(inc_filename);
}
else
{
/* relative path is relative to dir of calling file */
inc_fullname = (char *) palloc(strlen(outer_filename) + 1 +
strlen(inc_filename) + 1);
strcpy(inc_fullname, outer_filename);
get_parent_directory(inc_fullname);
join_path_components(inc_fullname, inc_fullname, inc_filename);
canonicalize_path(inc_fullname);
}
inc_file = AllocateFile(inc_fullname, "r");
if (inc_file == NULL)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not open secondary authentication file \"@%s\" as \"%s\": %m",
inc_filename, inc_fullname)));
pfree(inc_fullname);
/* return single space, it matches nothing */
return pstrdup(" ");
}
/* There is possible recursion here if the file contains @ */
tokenize_file(inc_fullname, inc_file, &inc_lines, &inc_line_nums);
FreeFile(inc_file);
pfree(inc_fullname);
/* Create comma-separated string from List */
comma_str = pstrdup("");
foreach(line, inc_lines)
{
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List *token_list = (List *) lfirst(line);
ListCell *token;
foreach(token, token_list)
{
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int oldlen = strlen(comma_str);
int needed;
needed = oldlen + strlen(lfirst(token)) + 1;
if (oldlen > 0)
needed++;
comma_str = repalloc(comma_str, needed);
if (oldlen > 0)
strcat(comma_str, MULTI_VALUE_SEP);
strcat(comma_str, lfirst(token));
}
}
free_lines(&inc_lines, &inc_line_nums);
/* if file is empty, return single space rather than empty string */
if (strlen(comma_str) == 0)
{
pfree(comma_str);
return pstrdup(" ");
}
return comma_str;
}
/*
* Tokenize the given file, storing the resulting data into two lists:
* a list of sublists, each sublist containing the tokens in a line of
* the file, and a list of line numbers.
*
* filename must be the absolute path to the target file.
*/
static void
tokenize_file(const char *filename, FILE *file,
List **lines, List **line_nums)
{
List *current_line = NIL;
int line_number = 1;
char *buf;
*lines = *line_nums = NIL;
while (!feof(file))
{
buf = next_token_expand(filename, file);
/* add token to list, unless we are at EOL or comment start */
if (buf)
{
if (current_line == NIL)
{
/* make a new line List, record its line number */
current_line = lappend(current_line, buf);
*lines = lappend(*lines, current_line);
*line_nums = lappend_int(*line_nums, line_number);
}
else
{
/* append token to current line's list */
current_line = lappend(current_line, buf);
}
}
else
{
/* we are at real or logical EOL, so force a new line List */
current_line = NIL;
/* Advance line number whenever we reach EOL */
line_number++;
}
}
}
/*
* Compare two lines based on their role/member names.
*
* Used for bsearch() lookup.
*/
static int
role_bsearch_cmp(const void *role, const void *list)
{
char *role2 = linitial(*(List **) list);
return strcmp(role, role2);
}
/*
* Lookup a role name in the pg_auth file
*/
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List **
get_role_line(const char *role)
{
/* On some versions of Solaris, bsearch of zero items dumps core */
if (role_length == 0)
return NULL;
return (List **) bsearch((void *) role,
(void *) role_sorted,
role_length,
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sizeof(List *),
role_bsearch_cmp);
}
/*
* Does user belong to role?
*
* user is always the name given as the attempted login identifier.
* We check to see if it is a member of the specified role name.
*/
static bool
is_member(const char *user, const char *role)
{
List **line;
ListCell *line_item;
if ((line = get_role_line(user)) == NULL)
return false; /* if user not exist, say "no" */
/* A user always belongs to its own role */
if (strcmp(user, role) == 0)
return true;
/*
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* skip over the role name, password, valuntil, examine all the membership
* entries
*/
if (list_length(*line) < 4)
return false;
for_each_cell(line_item, lnext(lnext(lnext(list_head(*line)))))
{
if (strcmp((char *) lfirst(line_item), role) == 0)
return true;
}
return false;
}
/*
* Check comma-separated list for a match to role, allowing group names.
*
* NB: param_str is destructively modified! In current usage, this is
* okay only because this code is run after forking off from the postmaster,
* and so it doesn't matter that we clobber the stored hba info.
*/
static bool
check_role(const char *role, char *param_str)
{
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char *tok;
for (tok = strtok(param_str, MULTI_VALUE_SEP);
tok != NULL;
tok = strtok(NULL, MULTI_VALUE_SEP))
{
if (tok[0] == '+')
{
if (is_member(role, tok + 1))
return true;
}
else if (strcmp(tok, role) == 0 ||
strcmp(tok, "all\n") == 0)
return true;
}
return false;
}
/*
* Check to see if db/role combination matches param string.
*
* NB: param_str is destructively modified! In current usage, this is
* okay only because this code is run after forking off from the postmaster,
* and so it doesn't matter that we clobber the stored hba info.
*/
static bool
check_db(const char *dbname, const char *role, char *param_str)
{
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char *tok;
for (tok = strtok(param_str, MULTI_VALUE_SEP);
tok != NULL;
tok = strtok(NULL, MULTI_VALUE_SEP))
{
if (strcmp(tok, "all\n") == 0)
return true;
else if (strcmp(tok, "sameuser\n") == 0)
{
if (strcmp(dbname, role) == 0)
return true;
}
else if (strcmp(tok, "samegroup\n") == 0 ||
strcmp(tok, "samerole\n") == 0)
{
if (is_member(role, dbname))
return true;
}
else if (strcmp(tok, dbname) == 0)
return true;
}
return false;
}
/*
* Scan the rest of a host record (after the mask field)
* and return the interpretation of it as *userauth_p, *auth_arg_p, and
* *error_p. *line_item points to the next token of the line, and is
* advanced over successfully-read tokens.
*/
static void
parse_hba_auth(ListCell **line_item, UserAuth *userauth_p,
char **auth_arg_p, bool *error_p)
{
char *token;
*auth_arg_p = NULL;
if (!*line_item)
{
*error_p = true;
return;
}
token = lfirst(*line_item);
if (strcmp(token, "trust") == 0)
*userauth_p = uaTrust;
else if (strcmp(token, "ident") == 0)
*userauth_p = uaIdent;
else if (strcmp(token, "password") == 0)
*userauth_p = uaPassword;
else if (strcmp(token, "krb5") == 0)
*userauth_p = uaKrb5;
else if (strcmp(token, "reject") == 0)
*userauth_p = uaReject;
else if (strcmp(token, "md5") == 0)
*userauth_p = uaMD5;
else if (strcmp(token, "crypt") == 0)
*userauth_p = uaCrypt;
#ifdef USE_PAM
else if (strcmp(token, "pam") == 0)
*userauth_p = uaPAM;
#endif
#ifdef USE_LDAP
else if (strcmp(token,"ldap") == 0)
*userauth_p = uaLDAP;
#endif
else
{
*error_p = true;
return;
}
*line_item = lnext(*line_item);
/* Get the authentication argument token, if any */
if (*line_item)
{
token = lfirst(*line_item);
*auth_arg_p = pstrdup(token);
*line_item = lnext(*line_item);
/* If there is more on the line, it is an error */
if (*line_item)
*error_p = true;
}
}
/*
* Process one line from the hba config file.
*
* See if it applies to a connection from a host with IP address port->raddr
* to a database named port->database. If so, return *found_p true
* and fill in the auth arguments into the appropriate port fields.
* If not, leave *found_p as it was. If the record has a syntax error,
* return *error_p true, after issuing a message to the log. If no error,
* leave *error_p as it was.
*/
static void
parse_hba(List *line, int line_num, hbaPort *port,
bool *found_p, bool *error_p)
{
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char *token;
char *db;
char *role;
struct addrinfo *gai_result;
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struct addrinfo hints;
int ret;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
struct sockaddr_storage mask;
char *cidr_slash;
ListCell *line_item;
line_item = list_head(line);
/* Check the record type. */
token = lfirst(line_item);
if (strcmp(token, "local") == 0)
{
/* Get the database. */
line_item = lnext(line_item);
if (!line_item)
goto hba_syntax;
db = lfirst(line_item);
/* Get the role. */
line_item = lnext(line_item);
if (!line_item)
goto hba_syntax;
role = lfirst(line_item);
line_item = lnext(line_item);
if (!line_item)
goto hba_syntax;
/* Read the rest of the line. */
parse_hba_auth(&line_item, &port->auth_method,
&port->auth_arg, error_p);
if (*error_p)
goto hba_syntax;
/* Disallow auth methods that always need TCP/IP sockets to work */
if (port->auth_method == uaKrb5)
goto hba_syntax;
/* Does not match if connection isn't AF_UNIX */
if (!IS_AF_UNIX(port->raddr.addr.ss_family))
return;
}
At long last I put together a patch to support 4 client SSL negotiation modes (and replace the requiressl boolean). The four options were first spelled out by Magnus Hagander <mha@sollentuna.net> on 2000-08-23 in email to pgsql-hackers, archived here: http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2000-08/msg00639.php My original less-flexible patch and the ensuing thread are archived at: http://dbforums.com/t623845.html Attached is a new patch, including documentation. To sum up, there's a new client parameter "sslmode" and environment variable "PGSSLMODE", with these options: sslmode description ------- ----------- disable Unencrypted non-SSL only allow Negotiate, prefer non-SSL prefer Negotiate, prefer SSL (default) require Require SSL The only change to the server is a new pg_hba.conf line type, "hostnossl", for specifying connections that are not allowed to use SSL (for example, to prevent servers on a local network from accidentally using SSL and wasting cycles). Thus the 3 pg_hba.conf line types are: pg_hba.conf line types ---------------------- host applies to either SSL or regular connections hostssl applies only to SSL connections hostnossl applies only to regular connections These client and server options, the postgresql.conf ssl = false option, and finally the possibility of compiling with no SSL support at all, make quite a range of combinations to test. I threw together a test script to try many of them out. It's in a separate tarball with its config files, a patch to psql so it'll announce SSL connections even in absence of a tty, and the test output. The test is especially informative when run on the same tty the postmaster was started on, so the FATAL: errors during negotiation are interleaved with the psql client output. I saw Tom write that new submissions for 7.4 have to be in before midnight local time, and since I'm on the east coast in the US, this just makes it in before the bell. :) Jon Jensen
2003-07-26 15:50:02 +02:00
else if (strcmp(token, "host") == 0
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|| strcmp(token, "hostssl") == 0
|| strcmp(token, "hostnossl") == 0)
{
2003-08-04 02:43:34 +02:00
if (token[4] == 's') /* "hostssl" */
{
#ifdef USE_SSL
/* Record does not match if we are not on an SSL connection */
if (!port->ssl)
return;
/* Placeholder to require specific SSL level, perhaps? */
/* Or a client certificate */
/* Since we were on SSL, proceed as with normal 'host' mode */
#else
/* We don't accept this keyword at all if no SSL support */
goto hba_syntax;
#endif
}
At long last I put together a patch to support 4 client SSL negotiation modes (and replace the requiressl boolean). The four options were first spelled out by Magnus Hagander <mha@sollentuna.net> on 2000-08-23 in email to pgsql-hackers, archived here: http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2000-08/msg00639.php My original less-flexible patch and the ensuing thread are archived at: http://dbforums.com/t623845.html Attached is a new patch, including documentation. To sum up, there's a new client parameter "sslmode" and environment variable "PGSSLMODE", with these options: sslmode description ------- ----------- disable Unencrypted non-SSL only allow Negotiate, prefer non-SSL prefer Negotiate, prefer SSL (default) require Require SSL The only change to the server is a new pg_hba.conf line type, "hostnossl", for specifying connections that are not allowed to use SSL (for example, to prevent servers on a local network from accidentally using SSL and wasting cycles). Thus the 3 pg_hba.conf line types are: pg_hba.conf line types ---------------------- host applies to either SSL or regular connections hostssl applies only to SSL connections hostnossl applies only to regular connections These client and server options, the postgresql.conf ssl = false option, and finally the possibility of compiling with no SSL support at all, make quite a range of combinations to test. I threw together a test script to try many of them out. It's in a separate tarball with its config files, a patch to psql so it'll announce SSL connections even in absence of a tty, and the test output. The test is especially informative when run on the same tty the postmaster was started on, so the FATAL: errors during negotiation are interleaved with the psql client output. I saw Tom write that new submissions for 7.4 have to be in before midnight local time, and since I'm on the east coast in the US, this just makes it in before the bell. :) Jon Jensen
2003-07-26 15:50:02 +02:00
#ifdef USE_SSL
2003-08-04 02:43:34 +02:00
else if (token[4] == 'n') /* "hostnossl" */
At long last I put together a patch to support 4 client SSL negotiation modes (and replace the requiressl boolean). The four options were first spelled out by Magnus Hagander <mha@sollentuna.net> on 2000-08-23 in email to pgsql-hackers, archived here: http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2000-08/msg00639.php My original less-flexible patch and the ensuing thread are archived at: http://dbforums.com/t623845.html Attached is a new patch, including documentation. To sum up, there's a new client parameter "sslmode" and environment variable "PGSSLMODE", with these options: sslmode description ------- ----------- disable Unencrypted non-SSL only allow Negotiate, prefer non-SSL prefer Negotiate, prefer SSL (default) require Require SSL The only change to the server is a new pg_hba.conf line type, "hostnossl", for specifying connections that are not allowed to use SSL (for example, to prevent servers on a local network from accidentally using SSL and wasting cycles). Thus the 3 pg_hba.conf line types are: pg_hba.conf line types ---------------------- host applies to either SSL or regular connections hostssl applies only to SSL connections hostnossl applies only to regular connections These client and server options, the postgresql.conf ssl = false option, and finally the possibility of compiling with no SSL support at all, make quite a range of combinations to test. I threw together a test script to try many of them out. It's in a separate tarball with its config files, a patch to psql so it'll announce SSL connections even in absence of a tty, and the test output. The test is especially informative when run on the same tty the postmaster was started on, so the FATAL: errors during negotiation are interleaved with the psql client output. I saw Tom write that new submissions for 7.4 have to be in before midnight local time, and since I'm on the east coast in the US, this just makes it in before the bell. :) Jon Jensen
2003-07-26 15:50:02 +02:00
{
/* Record does not match if we are on an SSL connection */
if (port->ssl)
return;
}
#endif
/* Get the database. */
line_item = lnext(line_item);
if (!line_item)
goto hba_syntax;
db = lfirst(line_item);
/* Get the role. */
line_item = lnext(line_item);
if (!line_item)
goto hba_syntax;
role = lfirst(line_item);
/* Read the IP address field. (with or without CIDR netmask) */
line_item = lnext(line_item);
if (!line_item)
goto hba_syntax;
token = lfirst(line_item);
/* Check if it has a CIDR suffix and if so isolate it */
2003-08-04 02:43:34 +02:00
cidr_slash = strchr(token, '/');
if (cidr_slash)
*cidr_slash = '\0';
/* Get the IP address either way */
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_socktype = 0;
hints.ai_protocol = 0;
hints.ai_addrlen = 0;
hints.ai_canonname = NULL;
hints.ai_addr = NULL;
hints.ai_next = NULL;
ret = pg_getaddrinfo_all(token, NULL, &hints, &gai_result);
if (ret || !gai_result)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
errmsg("invalid IP address \"%s\" in file \"%s\" line %d: %s",
token, HbaFileName, line_num,
gai_strerror(ret))));
if (cidr_slash)
*cidr_slash = '/';
if (gai_result)
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, gai_result);
goto hba_other_error;
}
if (cidr_slash)
*cidr_slash = '/';
memcpy(&addr, gai_result->ai_addr, gai_result->ai_addrlen);
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, gai_result);
/* Get the netmask */
if (cidr_slash)
{
if (pg_sockaddr_cidr_mask(&mask, cidr_slash + 1,
addr.ss_family) < 0)
goto hba_syntax;
}
else
{
/* Read the mask field. */
line_item = lnext(line_item);
if (!line_item)
goto hba_syntax;
token = lfirst(line_item);
ret = pg_getaddrinfo_all(token, NULL, &hints, &gai_result);
if (ret || !gai_result)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
errmsg("invalid IP mask \"%s\" in file \"%s\" line %d: %s",
token, HbaFileName, line_num,
gai_strerror(ret))));
if (gai_result)
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, gai_result);
goto hba_other_error;
}
memcpy(&mask, gai_result->ai_addr, gai_result->ai_addrlen);
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, gai_result);
if (addr.ss_family != mask.ss_family)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
2004-10-12 23:54:45 +02:00
errmsg("IP address and mask do not match in file \"%s\" line %d",
HbaFileName, line_num)));
goto hba_other_error;
}
}
if (addr.ss_family != port->raddr.addr.ss_family)
{
/*
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
* Wrong address family. We allow only one case: if the file has
* IPv4 and the port is IPv6, promote the file address to IPv6 and
* try to match that way.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET &&
port->raddr.addr.ss_family == AF_INET6)
{
pg_promote_v4_to_v6_addr(&addr);
pg_promote_v4_to_v6_mask(&mask);
}
else
2004-08-29 07:07:03 +02:00
#endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
{
/* Line doesn't match client port, so ignore it. */
return;
}
}
/* Ignore line if client port is not in the matching addr range. */
if (!pg_range_sockaddr(&port->raddr.addr, &addr, &mask))
return;
/* Read the rest of the line. */
line_item = lnext(line_item);
if (!line_item)
goto hba_syntax;
parse_hba_auth(&line_item, &port->auth_method,
&port->auth_arg, error_p);
if (*error_p)
goto hba_syntax;
}
else
goto hba_syntax;
/* Does the entry match database and role? */
if (!check_db(port->database_name, port->user_name, db))
return;
if (!check_role(port->user_name, role))
return;
/* Success */
*found_p = true;
return;
hba_syntax:
if (line_item)
ereport(LOG,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
errmsg("invalid entry in file \"%s\" at line %d, token \"%s\"",
HbaFileName, line_num,
(char *) lfirst(line_item))));
else
ereport(LOG,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
errmsg("missing field in file \"%s\" at end of line %d",
HbaFileName, line_num)));
/* Come here if suitable message already logged */
hba_other_error:
*error_p = true;
}
/*
* Scan the (pre-parsed) hba file line by line, looking for a match
* to the port's connection request.
*/
static bool
check_hba(hbaPort *port)
{
bool found_entry = false;
bool error = false;
ListCell *line;
ListCell *line_num;
1999-05-25 18:15:34 +02:00
forboth(line, hba_lines, line_num, hba_line_nums)
{
parse_hba(lfirst(line), lfirst_int(line_num),
port, &found_entry, &error);
if (found_entry || error)
break;
}
if (!error)
{
/* If no matching entry was found, synthesize 'reject' entry. */
if (!found_entry)
port->auth_method = uaReject;
return true;
}
else
return false;
}
/*
* Load role/password mapping file
*/
void
load_role(void)
{
char *filename;
FILE *role_file;
/* Discard any old data */
if (role_lines || role_line_nums)
free_lines(&role_lines, &role_line_nums);
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
if (role_sorted)
pfree(role_sorted);
role_sorted = NULL;
role_length = 0;
/* Read in the file contents */
filename = auth_getflatfilename();
role_file = AllocateFile(filename, "r");
if (role_file == NULL)
{
/* no complaint if not there */
if (errno != ENOENT)
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not open file \"%s\": %m", filename)));
pfree(filename);
return;
}
tokenize_file(filename, role_file, &role_lines, &role_line_nums);
FreeFile(role_file);
pfree(filename);
/* create array for binary searching */
role_length = list_length(role_lines);
if (role_length)
{
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
int i = 0;
ListCell *line;
2005-07-28 17:30:55 +02:00
/* We assume the flat file was written already-sorted */
role_sorted = palloc(role_length * sizeof(List *));
foreach(line, role_lines)
role_sorted[i++] = lfirst(line);
}
}
1998-12-14 07:50:32 +01:00
/*
* Read the config file and create a List of Lists of tokens in the file.
1998-12-14 07:50:32 +01:00
*/
void
load_hba(void)
{
FILE *file;
if (hba_lines || hba_line_nums)
free_lines(&hba_lines, &hba_line_nums);
file = AllocateFile(HbaFileName, "r");
/* Failure is fatal since with no HBA entries we can do nothing... */
if (file == NULL)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not open configuration file \"%s\": %m",
HbaFileName)));
tokenize_file(HbaFileName, file, &hba_lines, &hba_line_nums);
FreeFile(file);
}
/*
* Read and parse one line from the flat pg_database file.
*
* Returns TRUE on success, FALSE if EOF; bad data causes elog(FATAL).
*
* Output parameters:
* dbname: gets database name (must be of size NAMEDATALEN bytes)
* dboid: gets database OID
* dbtablespace: gets database's default tablespace's OID
* dbminxid: gets database's minimum XID
* dbvacuumxid: gets database's vacuum XID
*
* This is not much related to the other functions in hba.c, but we put it
* here because it uses the next_token() infrastructure.
*/
bool
read_pg_database_line(FILE *fp, char *dbname, Oid *dboid,
Oid *dbtablespace, TransactionId *dbminxid,
TransactionId *dbvacuumxid)
{
char buf[MAX_TOKEN];
if (feof(fp))
return false;
if (!next_token(fp, buf, sizeof(buf)))
return false;
if (strlen(buf) >= NAMEDATALEN)
elog(FATAL, "bad data in flat pg_database file");
strcpy(dbname, buf);
next_token(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (!isdigit((unsigned char) buf[0]))
elog(FATAL, "bad data in flat pg_database file");
*dboid = atooid(buf);
next_token(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (!isdigit((unsigned char) buf[0]))
elog(FATAL, "bad data in flat pg_database file");
*dbtablespace = atooid(buf);
next_token(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (!isdigit((unsigned char) buf[0]))
elog(FATAL, "bad data in flat pg_database file");
*dbminxid = atoxid(buf);
next_token(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (!isdigit((unsigned char) buf[0]))
elog(FATAL, "bad data in flat pg_database file");
*dbvacuumxid = atoxid(buf);
/* expect EOL next */
if (next_token(fp, buf, sizeof(buf)))
elog(FATAL, "bad data in flat pg_database file");
return true;
}
/*
* Process one line from the ident config file.
*
* Take the line and compare it to the needed map, pg_role and ident_user.
* *found_p and *error_p are set according to our results.
*/
static void
parse_ident_usermap(List *line, int line_number, const char *usermap_name,
const char *pg_role, const char *ident_user,
bool *found_p, bool *error_p)
{
ListCell *line_item;
char *token;
char *file_map;
char *file_pgrole;
char *file_ident_user;
*found_p = false;
*error_p = false;
Assert(line != NIL);
line_item = list_head(line);
/* Get the map token (must exist) */
token = lfirst(line_item);
file_map = token;
/* Get the ident user token */
line_item = lnext(line_item);
if (!line_item)
goto ident_syntax;
token = lfirst(line_item);
file_ident_user = token;
/* Get the PG rolename token */
line_item = lnext(line_item);
if (!line_item)
goto ident_syntax;
token = lfirst(line_item);
file_pgrole = token;
/* Match? */
if (strcmp(file_map, usermap_name) == 0 &&
strcmp(file_pgrole, pg_role) == 0 &&
strcmp(file_ident_user, ident_user) == 0)
*found_p = true;
return;
ident_syntax:
ereport(LOG,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
errmsg("missing entry in file \"%s\" at end of line %d",
IdentFileName, line_number)));
*error_p = true;
}
/*
* Scan the (pre-parsed) ident usermap file line by line, looking for a match
*
* See if the user with ident username "ident_user" is allowed to act
* as Postgres user "pgrole" according to usermap "usermap_name".
*
* Special case: For usermap "samerole", don't look in the usermap
* file. That's an implied map where "pgrole" must be identical to
* "ident_user" in order to be authorized.
*
* Iff authorized, return true.
*/
static bool
check_ident_usermap(const char *usermap_name,
const char *pg_role,
const char *ident_user)
{
bool found_entry = false,
error = false;
if (usermap_name == NULL || usermap_name[0] == '\0')
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
errmsg("cannot use Ident authentication without usermap field")));
found_entry = false;
}
else if (strcmp(usermap_name, "sameuser\n") == 0 ||
strcmp(usermap_name, "samerole\n") == 0)
{
if (strcmp(pg_role, ident_user) == 0)
found_entry = true;
else
found_entry = false;
}
else
{
2004-08-29 07:07:03 +02:00
ListCell *line_cell,
*num_cell;
forboth(line_cell, ident_lines, num_cell, ident_line_nums)
{
parse_ident_usermap(lfirst(line_cell), lfirst_int(num_cell),
usermap_name, pg_role, ident_user,
&found_entry, &error);
if (found_entry || error)
break;
}
}
return found_entry;
}
/*
* Read the ident config file and create a List of Lists of tokens in the file.
*/
void
load_ident(void)
{
FILE *file;
2004-08-29 07:07:03 +02:00
if (ident_lines || ident_line_nums)
free_lines(&ident_lines, &ident_line_nums);
file = AllocateFile(IdentFileName, "r");
if (file == NULL)
{
/* not fatal ... we just won't do any special ident maps */
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not open Ident usermap file \"%s\": %m",
IdentFileName)));
}
else
{
tokenize_file(IdentFileName, file, &ident_lines, &ident_line_nums);
FreeFile(file);
}
}
/*
* Parse the string "*ident_response" as a response from a query to an Ident
* server. If it's a normal response indicating a user name, return true
2002-09-04 22:31:48 +02:00
* and store the user name at *ident_user. If it's anything else,
* return false.
*/
static bool
interpret_ident_response(const char *ident_response,
char *ident_user)
{
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
const char *cursor = ident_response; /* Cursor into *ident_response */
/*
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
* Ident's response, in the telnet tradition, should end in crlf (\r\n).
*/
if (strlen(ident_response) < 2)
return false;
else if (ident_response[strlen(ident_response) - 2] != '\r')
return false;
else
{
while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r')
cursor++; /* skip port field */
if (*cursor != ':')
return false;
else
{
/* We're positioned to colon before response type field */
char response_type[80];
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
int i; /* Index into *response_type */
cursor++; /* Go over colon */
while (pg_isblank(*cursor))
cursor++; /* skip blanks */
i = 0;
while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r' && !pg_isblank(*cursor) &&
i < (int) (sizeof(response_type) - 1))
response_type[i++] = *cursor++;
response_type[i] = '\0';
while (pg_isblank(*cursor))
cursor++; /* skip blanks */
if (strcmp(response_type, "USERID") != 0)
return false;
else
{
/*
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
* It's a USERID response. Good. "cursor" should be pointing
* to the colon that precedes the operating system type.
*/
if (*cursor != ':')
return false;
else
{
cursor++; /* Go over colon */
/* Skip over operating system field. */
while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r')
cursor++;
if (*cursor != ':')
return false;
else
{
int i; /* Index into *ident_user */
cursor++; /* Go over colon */
while (pg_isblank(*cursor))
cursor++; /* skip blanks */
/* Rest of line is user name. Copy it over. */
i = 0;
while (*cursor != '\r' && i < IDENT_USERNAME_MAX)
ident_user[i++] = *cursor++;
ident_user[i] = '\0';
return true;
}
}
}
}
}
}
/*
* Talk to the ident server on host "remote_ip_addr" and find out who
* owns the tcp connection from his port "remote_port" to port
* "local_port_addr" on host "local_ip_addr". Return the user name the
* ident server gives as "*ident_user".
*
* IP addresses and port numbers are in network byte order.
*
* But iff we're unable to get the information from ident, return false.
*/
static bool
ident_inet(const SockAddr remote_addr,
const SockAddr local_addr,
char *ident_user)
{
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
int sock_fd, /* File descriptor for socket on which we talk
* to Ident */
rc; /* Return code from a locally called function */
bool ident_return;
char remote_addr_s[NI_MAXHOST];
char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV];
char local_addr_s[NI_MAXHOST];
char local_port[NI_MAXSERV];
char ident_port[NI_MAXSERV];
char ident_query[80];
char ident_response[80 + IDENT_USERNAME_MAX];
2003-08-04 02:43:34 +02:00
struct addrinfo *ident_serv = NULL,
*la = NULL,
hints;
/*
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
* Might look a little weird to first convert it to text and then back to
* sockaddr, but it's protocol independent.
*/
pg_getnameinfo_all(&remote_addr.addr, remote_addr.salen,
remote_addr_s, sizeof(remote_addr_s),
remote_port, sizeof(remote_port),
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV);
pg_getnameinfo_all(&local_addr.addr, local_addr.salen,
local_addr_s, sizeof(local_addr_s),
local_port, sizeof(local_port),
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV);
snprintf(ident_port, sizeof(ident_port), "%d", IDENT_PORT);
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
hints.ai_family = remote_addr.addr.ss_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_protocol = 0;
hints.ai_addrlen = 0;
hints.ai_canonname = NULL;
hints.ai_addr = NULL;
hints.ai_next = NULL;
rc = pg_getaddrinfo_all(remote_addr_s, ident_port, &hints, &ident_serv);
2004-08-29 07:07:03 +02:00
if (rc || !ident_serv)
{
*) inet_(client|server)_(addr|port)() and necessary documentation for the four functions. > Also, please justify the temp-related changes. I was not aware that we > had any breakage there. patch-tmp-schema.txt contains the following bits: *) Changes pg_namespace_aclmask() so that the superuser is always able to create objects in the temp namespace. *) Changes pg_namespace_aclmask() so that if this is a temp namespace, objects are only allowed to be created in the temp namespace if the user has TEMP privs on the database. This encompasses all object creation, not just TEMP tables. *) InitTempTableNamespace() checks to see if the current user, not the session user, has access to create a temp namespace. The first two changes are necessary to support the third change. Now it's possible to revoke all temp table privs from non-super users and limiting all creation of temp tables/schemas via a function that's executed with elevated privs (security definer). Before this change, it was not possible to have a setuid function to create a temp table/schema if the session user had no TEMP privs. patch-area-path.txt contains: *) Can now determine the area of a closed path. patch-dfmgr.txt contains: *) Small tweak to add the library path that's being expanded. I was using $lib/foo.so and couldn't easily figure out what the error message, "invalid macro name in dynamic library path" meant without looking through the source code. With the path in there, at least I know where to start looking in my config file. Sean Chittenden
2004-05-26 20:35:51 +02:00
if (ident_serv)
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, ident_serv);
return false; /* we don't expect this to happen */
*) inet_(client|server)_(addr|port)() and necessary documentation for the four functions. > Also, please justify the temp-related changes. I was not aware that we > had any breakage there. patch-tmp-schema.txt contains the following bits: *) Changes pg_namespace_aclmask() so that the superuser is always able to create objects in the temp namespace. *) Changes pg_namespace_aclmask() so that if this is a temp namespace, objects are only allowed to be created in the temp namespace if the user has TEMP privs on the database. This encompasses all object creation, not just TEMP tables. *) InitTempTableNamespace() checks to see if the current user, not the session user, has access to create a temp namespace. The first two changes are necessary to support the third change. Now it's possible to revoke all temp table privs from non-super users and limiting all creation of temp tables/schemas via a function that's executed with elevated privs (security definer). Before this change, it was not possible to have a setuid function to create a temp table/schema if the session user had no TEMP privs. patch-area-path.txt contains: *) Can now determine the area of a closed path. patch-dfmgr.txt contains: *) Small tweak to add the library path that's being expanded. I was using $lib/foo.so and couldn't easily figure out what the error message, "invalid macro name in dynamic library path" meant without looking through the source code. With the path in there, at least I know where to start looking in my config file. Sean Chittenden
2004-05-26 20:35:51 +02:00
}
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
hints.ai_family = local_addr.addr.ss_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_protocol = 0;
hints.ai_addrlen = 0;
hints.ai_canonname = NULL;
hints.ai_addr = NULL;
hints.ai_next = NULL;
rc = pg_getaddrinfo_all(local_addr_s, NULL, &hints, &la);
2004-08-29 07:07:03 +02:00
if (rc || !la)
{
*) inet_(client|server)_(addr|port)() and necessary documentation for the four functions. > Also, please justify the temp-related changes. I was not aware that we > had any breakage there. patch-tmp-schema.txt contains the following bits: *) Changes pg_namespace_aclmask() so that the superuser is always able to create objects in the temp namespace. *) Changes pg_namespace_aclmask() so that if this is a temp namespace, objects are only allowed to be created in the temp namespace if the user has TEMP privs on the database. This encompasses all object creation, not just TEMP tables. *) InitTempTableNamespace() checks to see if the current user, not the session user, has access to create a temp namespace. The first two changes are necessary to support the third change. Now it's possible to revoke all temp table privs from non-super users and limiting all creation of temp tables/schemas via a function that's executed with elevated privs (security definer). Before this change, it was not possible to have a setuid function to create a temp table/schema if the session user had no TEMP privs. patch-area-path.txt contains: *) Can now determine the area of a closed path. patch-dfmgr.txt contains: *) Small tweak to add the library path that's being expanded. I was using $lib/foo.so and couldn't easily figure out what the error message, "invalid macro name in dynamic library path" meant without looking through the source code. With the path in there, at least I know where to start looking in my config file. Sean Chittenden
2004-05-26 20:35:51 +02:00
if (la)
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, la);
return false; /* we don't expect this to happen */
*) inet_(client|server)_(addr|port)() and necessary documentation for the four functions. > Also, please justify the temp-related changes. I was not aware that we > had any breakage there. patch-tmp-schema.txt contains the following bits: *) Changes pg_namespace_aclmask() so that the superuser is always able to create objects in the temp namespace. *) Changes pg_namespace_aclmask() so that if this is a temp namespace, objects are only allowed to be created in the temp namespace if the user has TEMP privs on the database. This encompasses all object creation, not just TEMP tables. *) InitTempTableNamespace() checks to see if the current user, not the session user, has access to create a temp namespace. The first two changes are necessary to support the third change. Now it's possible to revoke all temp table privs from non-super users and limiting all creation of temp tables/schemas via a function that's executed with elevated privs (security definer). Before this change, it was not possible to have a setuid function to create a temp table/schema if the session user had no TEMP privs. patch-area-path.txt contains: *) Can now determine the area of a closed path. patch-dfmgr.txt contains: *) Small tweak to add the library path that's being expanded. I was using $lib/foo.so and couldn't easily figure out what the error message, "invalid macro name in dynamic library path" meant without looking through the source code. With the path in there, at least I know where to start looking in my config file. Sean Chittenden
2004-05-26 20:35:51 +02:00
}
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sock_fd = socket(ident_serv->ai_family, ident_serv->ai_socktype,
ident_serv->ai_protocol);
if (sock_fd < 0)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_socket_access(),
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errmsg("could not create socket for Ident connection: %m")));
ident_return = false;
goto ident_inet_done;
}
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/*
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* Bind to the address which the client originally contacted, otherwise
* the ident server won't be able to match up the right connection. This
* is necessary if the PostgreSQL server is running on an IP alias.
*/
rc = bind(sock_fd, la->ai_addr, la->ai_addrlen);
if (rc != 0)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_socket_access(),
errmsg("could not bind to local address \"%s\": %m",
local_addr_s)));
ident_return = false;
goto ident_inet_done;
}
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rc = connect(sock_fd, ident_serv->ai_addr,
ident_serv->ai_addrlen);
if (rc != 0)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_socket_access(),
errmsg("could not connect to Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m",
remote_addr_s, ident_port)));
ident_return = false;
goto ident_inet_done;
}
/* The query we send to the Ident server */
snprintf(ident_query, sizeof(ident_query), "%s,%s\r\n",
remote_port, local_port);
/* loop in case send is interrupted */
do
{
rc = send(sock_fd, ident_query, strlen(ident_query), 0);
} while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR);
if (rc < 0)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_socket_access(),
errmsg("could not send query to Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m",
remote_addr_s, ident_port)));
ident_return = false;
goto ident_inet_done;
}
do
{
rc = recv(sock_fd, ident_response, sizeof(ident_response) - 1, 0);
} while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR);
if (rc < 0)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_socket_access(),
errmsg("could not receive response from Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m",
remote_addr_s, ident_port)));
ident_return = false;
goto ident_inet_done;
}
ident_response[rc] = '\0';
ident_return = interpret_ident_response(ident_response, ident_user);
if (!ident_return)
ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("invalidly formatted response from Ident server: \"%s\"",
ident_response)));
ident_inet_done:
if (sock_fd >= 0)
closesocket(sock_fd);
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(remote_addr.addr.ss_family, ident_serv);
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(local_addr.addr.ss_family, la);
return ident_return;
}
/*
* Ask kernel about the credentials of the connecting process and
* determine the symbolic name of the corresponding user.
*
* Returns either true and the username put into "ident_user",
* or false if we were unable to determine the username.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
static bool
ident_unix(int sock, char *ident_user)
{
#if defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID)
/* OpenBSD style: */
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uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
struct passwd *pass;
errno = 0;
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if (getpeereid(sock, &uid, &gid) != 0)
{
/* We didn't get a valid credentials struct. */
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_socket_access(),
errmsg("could not get peer credentials: %m")));
return false;
}
pass = getpwuid(uid);
if (pass == NULL)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errmsg("local user with ID %d does not exist",
(int) uid)));
return false;
}
StrNCpy(ident_user, pass->pw_name, IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1);
return true;
#elif defined(SO_PEERCRED)
/* Linux style: use getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED) */
struct ucred peercred;
ACCEPT_TYPE_ARG3 so_len = sizeof(peercred);
struct passwd *pass;
errno = 0;
if (getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &peercred, &so_len) != 0 ||
so_len != sizeof(peercred))
{
/* We didn't get a valid credentials struct. */
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_socket_access(),
errmsg("could not get peer credentials: %m")));
return false;
}
pass = getpwuid(peercred.uid);
if (pass == NULL)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errmsg("local user with ID %d does not exist",
(int) peercred.uid)));
return false;
}
StrNCpy(ident_user, pass->pw_name, IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1);
return true;
#elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || (defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED) && defined(LOCAL_CREDS))
struct msghdr msg;
/* Credentials structure */
#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED)
typedef struct cmsgcred Cred;
#define cruid cmcred_uid
#elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED)
typedef struct fcred Cred;
#define cruid fc_uid
#elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED)
typedef struct sockcred Cred;
#define cruid sc_uid
#endif
Cred *cred;
/* Compute size without padding */
char cmsgmem[ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + ALIGN(sizeof(Cred))]; /* for NetBSD */
/* Point to start of first structure */
struct cmsghdr *cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *) cmsgmem;
struct iovec iov;
char buf;
struct passwd *pw;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_control = (char *) cmsg;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgmem);
memset(cmsg, 0, sizeof(cmsgmem));
/*
* The one character which is received here is not meaningful; its
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
* purposes is only to make sure that recvmsg() blocks long enough for the
* other side to send its credentials.
*/
iov.iov_base = &buf;
iov.iov_len = 1;
if (recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0 ||
cmsg->cmsg_len < sizeof(cmsgmem) ||
cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_CREDS)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_socket_access(),
errmsg("could not get peer credentials: %m")));
return false;
}
cred = (Cred *) CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
pw = getpwuid(cred->cruid);
if (pw == NULL)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errmsg("local user with ID %d does not exist",
(int) cred->cruid)));
return false;
}
StrNCpy(ident_user, pw->pw_name, IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1);
return true;
#else
ereport(LOG,
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
errmsg("Ident authentication is not supported on local connections on this platform")));
return false;
#endif
}
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#endif /* HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS */
/*
* Determine the username of the initiator of the connection described
* by "port". Then look in the usermap file under the usermap
* port->auth_arg and see if that user is equivalent to Postgres user
* port->user.
*
* Return STATUS_OK if yes, STATUS_ERROR if no match (or couldn't get info).
*/
int
authident(hbaPort *port)
{
char ident_user[IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1];
switch (port->raddr.addr.ss_family)
{
case AF_INET:
#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
case AF_INET6:
#endif
if (!ident_inet(port->raddr, port->laddr, ident_user))
return STATUS_ERROR;
break;
#ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
case AF_UNIX:
if (!ident_unix(port->sock, ident_user))
return STATUS_ERROR;
break;
#endif
default:
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
ereport(DEBUG2,
2004-10-12 23:54:45 +02:00
(errmsg("Ident protocol identifies remote user as \"%s\"",
ident_user)));
if (check_ident_usermap(port->auth_arg, port->user_name, ident_user))
return STATUS_OK;
else
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
/*
* Determine what authentication method should be used when accessing database
* "database" from frontend "raddr", user "user". Return the method and
* an optional argument (stored in fields of *port), and STATUS_OK.
*
* Note that STATUS_ERROR indicates a problem with the hba config file.
* If the file is OK but does not contain any entry matching the request,
* we return STATUS_OK and method = uaReject.
*/
int
hba_getauthmethod(hbaPort *port)
{
if (check_hba(port))
return STATUS_OK;
else
return STATUS_ERROR;
}